



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


Department of the Navy

Fiscal Years  
1992-1993

# Report to the Congress


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<b>Posture Statement by the Secretary of the Navy</b> <b>H. Lawrence Garrett, III.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Posture Statement by the Chief of Naval Operations</b> <b>Admiral F.B. Kelso, II.....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Posture Statement by the Commandant of the Marine Corps</b> <b>General A.M. Gray.....</b>	<b>46</b>



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**The Honorable  
H. Lawrence Garrett, III  
Secretary of the Navy**

On April 13, 1989, President Bush nominated H. Lawrence Garrett III to be the Secretary of the Navy. Mr. Garrett was confirmed by the Senate May 12, 1989 and took the oath of office May 15, 1989, becoming the 68th Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Garrett was born June 24, 1939, in Washington, D.C., and raised in Miami, Fla. He enlisted in the United States Navy in October 1961 and subsequently qualified in submarines as a machinist's mate. Mr. Garrett was commissioned in April 1964 upon completion of flight training, serving as a naval flight officer aboard maritime patrol aircraft. Subsequently, he completed operational tours in VP-50 including deployments in Vietnam.

In 1972 he transferred to the Judge Advocate General's Corps, where he rose to the rank of commander. He served from 1974 to 1978 as Force Judge Advocate/Legal Advisor to the Commander, Submarine Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor. In January 1979, while serving in the Office of Civil Law in Washington, D.C., Office of the JAG, he was detailed to assist in developing the federal regulations pertaining to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. In February 1981 he was detailed to the White House as Assistant Counsel in the Office of Counsel to the President. He retired from



the Navy in 1981.

Subsequently, Mr. Garrett was Executive Assistant to the President and Chief Operating Officer of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation. In 1983 he returned to the White House as Associate Counsel to the President. Mr. Garrett served as General Counsel of the Department of Defense from February 1986 to August 1987. Prior to his appointment as Secretary, Mr. Garrett served as Undersecretary of the Navy from Aug. 6, 1987.

Mr. Garrett earned a B.S. degree in Business Management from the University of West Florida in Pensacola, Fla., and received his J.D. degree from the University of San Diego Law School, San Diego, graduating cum laude.

A member of the California and District of Columbia Bars, he is licensed to practice before the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of California, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.

Mr. Garrett is married to the former Marilyn K. Bender of San Diego. They reside in Oakton, Va. They have two children, H. Lawrence Garrett IV and Mrs. Juliana Relihan.

## Posture Statement by the Secretary of the Navy

### Table of Contents

Introduction .....	4
<i>DESERT SHIELD</i> and <i>DESERT STORM</i> : Naval Successes .....	5
Naval Policy .....	6
The Receding Soviet Threat .....	7
Naval Strategy .....	7
Future Strategy and Force Structure .....	8
Priorities .....	9
People.....	9
Training and Readiness .....	9
War Preparedness .....	9
Balanced Force Reductions and Force Structure .....	9
Infrastructure and Industrial Base .....	9
Technology .....	9
Naval Forces in the New Post-Cold War Environment .....	10
The Budget.....	10
Force and Manpower Levels .....	11
Naval Aviation .....	12
Surface Warfare .....	13
The Submarine Force .....	14
Marine Corps Programs .....	14
Sealift .....	14
Research and Development .....	14
Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve .....	15
Anti-Submarine Warfare .....	16
C3I .....	16
Counternarcotics Operations .....	16
Defense Management Report Progress .....	17
ASN (RD&A) .....	17
ASN (I&E) .....	18
Environment .....	18
Infrastructure Ashore .....	19
Total Quality Leadership .....	19
Conclusion .....	19


**A Report by  
The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III  
Secretary of the Navy  
on the Posture and the Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget  
of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps**

**Introduction**

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I welcome the opportunity today to review with you the posture of the Department of the Navy, to present our biennial budget for fiscal years 1992 and 1993, and to review the operations of our Navy and Marine Corps during the past year. This is my third appearance before this committee, once presenting this report as the department's undersecretary, and last year for the first time as Secretary of the Navy. As I stated in my report a year ago, we see increasingly dramatic changes throughout the world. We are witnessing events that we could not have predicted in advance. These changes are

shaping what the President has appropriately called a new world order.

I view the presentation of this posture statement as my most important task thus far as Secretary of the Navy. The events in today's headlines are among the most consequential for the United States since World War II. My message today is framed by the events in the Middle East, and it is very simple. Over the past decade we have chosen to invest a great deal in the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps. In terms of naval power, we have bought a tremen-



dous amount of capability with that investment. Since the defense build up, and prior to Operation *DESERT STORM*, we had not been called upon to perform in combat to this degree, so we had not fully verified the wisdom of our force building. It is apparent now that we did the right thing. The vision of the national leadership has clearly been validated many times over. Navy and Marine Corps weapons, equipment and people have combined to give the U.S. the most capable sea power in the world today. In and around the Persian Gulf, U.S. naval forces are participating in joint and combined combat operations to defend Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait.

Besides the Middle East conflict, U.S. naval forces remain deployed all around the globe, maintaining a forward presence in support of America's security objectives and global interests.

### ***DESERT SHIELD* and *DESERT STORM*: Naval Successes**

When Iraq invaded Kuwait Aug. 2, 1990, the Navy's Middle East Force, part of the existing Joint Task Force Middle East, had a total of eight ships assigned. USS *LA SALLE* (AGF-3) was in theater as the force flagship, accompanied by one cruiser, one destroyer, and five frigates. To deter further Iraqi aggression, the aircraft carriers USS *INDEPENDENCE* (CV-62) and USS *DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER* (CVN-69) moved immediately to the northern Arabian Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. Consequently, naval deterrent air power was on station three days before the ground force and land-based air force deployments began. Our maritime prepositioning ships sortied from Guam and Diego Garcia Aug. 7. The first ship unloaded in Saudi Arabia one day after the lead Marine element arrived. Accordingly, the Seventh Marine Expeditionary Brigade (7th MEB) became the first fully operational, combat-ready, mechanized force in Saudi Arabia. The activation of over 70 ships from this nation's Ready Reserve Force and the accompanying massive sealift operation paid off significantly. It is important to note that over 85 percent of United States supplies, munitions and equipment in Saudi Arabia to date moved there by sea.

When Operation *DESERT STORM* began last month, we had over 100 ships, over 67,000 sailors, six aircraft carrier battle groups, two battleships, attack submarines, a 31-ship amphibious battle group with over 17,000 Marines embarked and a heavily reinforced Marine Expeditionary Force with over 68,000 Marines ashore in theater.

Operation *DESERT SHIELD*, which became Operation *DESERT STORM*, is the largest, best sustained and most successful maritime interdiction operation ever undertaken by the

United States. In support of the United Nations' economic embargo of Iraq, we challenged and intercepted over 7,000 ships. Nothing got through from the sea.

The first shots of Operation *DESERT STORM* were *TOMAHAWK* cruise missiles launched from our ships in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea against carefully selected military targets in Iraq. The cruise missile assault began an air campaign marked by unprecedented cooperation between U.S. and coalition forces. Our Navy carrier-based and Marine Corps land-based aircraft have played key roles throughout the campaign, providing about one-third of U.S. sorties. At the same time, the Navy has eliminated any threat posed by the Iraqi navy. Our naval support throughout this joint and combined military effort is an unqualified success story and one of which we are justifiably proud.

During the force buildup for Operation *DESERT SHIELD*, many of our national successes were maritime successes. Naval forces provided to our nation's leadership a wide range of options. We had the option to defend, the option to embargo, and eventually the option to reinforce our forces and eject Iraq from Kuwait. We had options that were immediately available without the assistance of any other nation, and we had options offering military support to other sovereign states outside the region.

The maritime interdiction operations in Operation *DESERT SHIELD* were superb. In Operation *DESERT STORM*, Saddam Hussein has learned too late the most essential lesson of sea power: You either have the ability to keep sea lanes open to provide for the economic well being of your nation, or you do not.

A clear lesson we have learned from interdiction and combat operations to date is the overwhelming advantage technology has given our Navy and Marine Corps. This advantage promises to allow us to end this conflict relatively quickly with the fewest number of American casualties.

Once again, sea control has proven to be a nonnegotiable necessity for successful power projection. In the conflict with Iraq, sea control was nearly a given. However, in other potential regional conflicts, air superiority, surface superiority and undersea superiority might well be more challenging. Achieving sea control and air superiority near land and over land will be complex and demanding. Systems designed for operations in the open ocean environment may not work as well. Warning and reaction time will be reduced, and the tactical picture will be different. Our naval forces will have to be capable of achieving air, surface and undersea superiority to ensure that follow-on ground and air forces can be quickly introduced. After land-based forces are on scene, we



must provide the protection to ensure that sealift and airlift continue unabated, while enhancing from the sea America's land-based power projection capabilities. Simply stated, power projection operations beyond our own shores cannot be sustained without control of the sea.

## Naval Policy

The United States has been the world's preeminent maritime power since the end of World War II. We have been able to sail the high seas uncontested. Global peace and stability have been greatly enhanced and often guaranteed directly by United States maritime power. Today, however, we are facing severe reductions in naval forces. We are also facing changes in the international security environment. Our challenge is to sustain our traditional maritime preeminence through the effects of these changes.

Today we find ourselves amidst one of history's great ironies. While the world progresses toward democratization, conflict nevertheless continues in Southwest Asia. Events in the Soviet Union give us real cause for concern. On the Arabian peninsula and in the Persian Gulf we are engaged in a real war. When that war is over, we must continue to forge a national policy that is consistent with and which fosters the new world order. It will be especially important for the Department of the Navy to be realistic about expected resources and force structure. Nevertheless, we will continue our vital contribution to stability and security on the seas and throughout the littoral regions of the world.

Our naval policy begins with the principal charter of the Department of the Navy. Simply put, to the degree fiscal constraints permit, we must provide the nation's military commanders with a Navy and a Marine Corps capable of performing their missions worldwide, naval forces which can sustain forward presence as called for by the national security

strategy and forces able to adjust to changing strategic and tactical circumstances.

There is general agreement in America that the world is no longer faced with an immediate Soviet threat. Rather than a world threatened by bi-polar superpower confrontation, this is a world which will be shaped by multi-polar interests and regional conflicts. In this world, we will have a smaller Navy and a smaller Marine Corps. We will, however, retain the elements of conventional deterrence, strategic nuclear deterrence and the flexibility necessary to respond to threats throughout the world.

The distinct challenge to the Department of the Navy will be to sustain the maritime power which we currently possess. The goal of our defense programs is to provide flexible forces, forward deployed. They must be capable of conducting major sustained operations like Operation *DESERT STORM*, yet be able to respond to contingencies like the non-combatant evacuations of Liberia and Mogadishu.

Even with a smaller Navy and Marine Corps, we must maintain maritime superiority. Naval strength enables us to exercise world leadership across the oceans as we build new alliances while maintaining our traditional alliances.

1990 and 1991 are watershed years for our new naval policy. We are adjusting our naval forces to a new global strategic reality, and we are nearer to the beginning of a period of transition than we are to the middle or the end of it.

Some of our past strategic and policy concepts are no longer applicable to the future. There are four implications of change to our United States naval policy:

*Economic interdependence.* We will have a continued global engagement, with naval forces providing presence throughout the world. We cannot afford to retreat into isolationism.

*New political realities.* There will be limits on United States access throughout the world. We will not enjoy the overseas basing upon which we have previously relied. Sea-based forces will play a more central role during the early phases of future crises.

*Different threats.* These threats will include terrorists and Third World countries with state-of-the-art weapons. Some regional powers will threaten their neighbors. Some nations will strive to acquire or develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and have the will to use them. The emerging world may be even more prone to conflict than the old world of the superpower confrontation.

**Uncertainty.** Timing, location, and even the identity of threats will be uncertain. We may not have clear warning, and we may not understand political motivation.

## The Receding Soviet Threat

Our traditional threat has been the Soviet Union, where fundamental forces of change are at work. The Soviets would like a calmer international climate, especially with respect to the United States. They would like to focus on their internal economic and political concerns. Last month, however, we saw a contradictory trend in Soviet policy, and it is disquieting.

The Soviets now have a declared defensive doctrine, which we have seen in their operations. Their military leadership has insisted that the threat of war with the United States has receded, yet they still consider military threats to the Soviet Union to be significant. In the naval environment, the Soviets remain just as capable today as they were six years ago. We have seen political changes and clear defensive intentions, but it would certainly be imprudent to dismiss the Soviet threat. We should not take irreversible action on our own while Soviet naval capabilities are this formidable, and while the Soviet political scene is so unstable and unpredictable.

## Naval Strategy


If our strategy for the cold war was one of containment, our new strategy should be one of stability, focusing on peacetime presence and regional conflict. We will prevent regional conflict where we can, engaging ourselves militarily only when we must. In the 1980s, our forces were built to counter the Soviet threat. In the 1990s, the forces we will retain and build must address peacetime presence, deal with regional contingencies and continue to pace the Soviet threat. The decades since World War II required maritime superiority, and so do the 1990s. Fiscal realities have also made affordability an important factor to be considered in sustaining maritime superiority. We must provide the best affordable mix of forces and capabilities. And we must maintain for the Navy and the Marine Corps a high state of readiness.

The hard work of freedom includes maintaining a regional peacetime presence. By maintaining a global forward presence with sea-based forces, we are not bound to any land mass, and can respond wherever Americans or American interests are threatened worldwide.

In our stability strategy, there is a fundamental shift in force structure and operations. Power projection forces have a greatly increased strategic value. Naval forces' striking

capabilities are important, something clearly illustrated by Operation *DESERT STORM*. Air strikes have been conducted by carrier-based aircraft. *TOMAHAWK* cruise missiles were launched from surface ships and submarines. The Marine Corps has provided a forcible entry capability in amphibious warfare and rapid response with maritime prepositioned forces.

Given continued changes in the Soviet Union, we eventually expect to see a diminished open-ocean anti-submarine warfare threat. It must be said, however, that while the po-





tential for a Soviet threat on the open ocean has not diminished, Soviet intentions today are more clear with respect to a defensive deployment of forces. Their capabilities, however, have not exactly matched their strategic intentions. The high technological quality of the Soviet submarine threat, apart from political considerations, remains a major concern. We must retain viable force structures while we draw down to a level appropriate to the threats we expect to face. Some Soviet naval threat will continue, and we should be prepared to counter it as necessary. We are continually reassessing the Soviet Union, and must reserve the right to rebuild in response to its action in the future.

## Future Strategy and Force Structure

In the new world order, we may find an increasing maritime emphasis, mainly because the future of overseas basing is, at best, problematical. It would be wrong to withdraw to a "Fortress United States." Instead, we must ensure that elements of all services, particularly the naval services, are forward-deployed. Our forward presence maintains stability for conventional deterrence and readiness for crisis response. Naval forces are almost always the first on scene in time of crisis and bring with them a full range of military options. If amphibious forcible entry becomes necessary, Marines are always embarked in amphibious ships that are continually forward deployed.

As America serves the world fostering freedom and democracy, we may find more nations asserting their sovereignty by denying the U.S. bases for tactical aircraft, overflight rights and forward basing of ground forces. Naval forces solve this problem. This is a principal reason for our national insistence on maintaining a strong Navy and Marine Corps.

In any joint operation, naval forces play a vital "stiff-arm" role to allow the rapid introduction of heavy ground forces and land-based air forces. This was clearly demonstrated last August in the opening days of Operation *DESERT SHIELD*.

The cornerstone of United States defense policy is to provide credible deterrent forces, convincing any potential adversary that his contemplated aggression against U.S. national interests cannot succeed. Several capabilities are essential to achieve credible deterrence in the evolving international security environment. These capabilities are the essence of our naval force structure charter.

Strategic nuclear deterrent forces remain the bedrock of our national defense. Deterring Soviet nuclear capabilities is still essential to U.S. survival. Our nuclear-powered strategic submarine force contributes to this deterrent and anchors the Navy's contributions to the nation's defense.



Peacetime forward presence of U.S. naval forces is the main element of conventional deterrence. "Forward presence" is a change from the cold war's "forward defense" in Europe, but there is little change from a historic U.S. naval perspective. It is consistent with the receding threat and reduced force levels driven by fiscal constraint. Forward presence is critical to deter aggression and preserve regional stability. Forward presence protects U.S. interests and provides the most visible evidence of our commitment to employ our military capability. With forward deployed forces, we can respond to crisis and control escalation beyond the initial outbreak of violence.

Peacetime forward presence is also critical to maintain our security alliances. We shall continue to maintain a forward maritime presence in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, the North Atlantic, the South Atlantic and the waters around the North American continent.

The Department of the Navy must be prepared for a major regional contingency. The mobility of national forces is critical toward supporting this part of our national strategy. Strategic sealift, amphibious forces and maritime prepositioning forces, in particular, are keys to our successful response to regional crises.

Our nation must retain the capability to respond to a rapid shift in Soviet strategy which could return us quickly to bipolar global confrontation. The ability to reconstitute forces rapidly means that politically, we must make early decisions. This is particularly critical for naval forces, where shipbuilding is complex and long-term. It is imperative that our naval industrial base be preserved.

## Priorities

The Department of the Navy fiscal year 1992/1993 budget responds to these challenges. The budget is based on complementing priorities. Our priorities are people, training and readiness, war preparedness, balanced force reductions and force structure, infrastructure and industrial base, and technology.

### People

Our most important budget priority for 1992 is maintaining the high quality of our sailors and Marines. In today's headlines, we are increasingly focused on technology. We should not forget that this war is being fought not by machines, but by men and women of significant dedication, courage, and professionalism. Through their sacrifice we are winning the war in Southwest Asia. Through their efforts our strategy will succeed in the future. Their concerns are my concerns: compensation, quality of life, training and the benefits we provide them as service members, veterans and retirees. We have an all volunteer force, and it works.

### Training and Readiness

Ensuring that the Navy and Marine Corps are ready for



combat is the most significant task facing the Department of the Navy. Training and readiness are essential to the execution of our naval strategy. Training and readiness are critical today, particularly when resources are limited and the future is uncertain. We are committed to ensuring that our naval forces are trained and equipped to respond to any contingency despite limited resources. We shall not return to a hollow force. Our forces will be smaller but just as capable of meeting the threats of the future.

### War Preparedness

We were prepared in 1990 to respond to a crisis in Southwest Asia. Today, being prepared means sustainability, supporting full-scale offensive operations indefinitely. War preparedness into the 21st century will mean a realistically measured force level, guaranteeing our people quality of life while maintaining a full readiness and response capability.

### Balanced Force Reductions and Force Structure


We have already begun building down toward a smaller, balanced force. As ships retire they will be replaced with more capable ships at less than a 1-to-1 ratio. Other ships will be retired when due for overhaul in order to cut back at the most cost-sensible point. Older submarines will be retired rather than undergoing nuclear refueling overhauls. Our Marine Corps will get smaller not only by reducing, but also by restructuring. The future force must meet the demands of peacetime presence and response to major regional crises. Because we will have less surge capability, some high tempo operations will become more difficult. We believe that the key to a smaller force is balance. We must avoid giving the perception of weakness that might cause a potential adversary to misread us, and therefore weaken the credibility of our deterrent strategy.

### Infrastructure and Industrial Base

The United States cannot maintain strategic advantage without a credible, capable industrial base. The capability to expand substantially our shipbuilding may well be necessary in the future. The strength of our national industry is as important to the national security as our military forces. To be able to reconstitute forces, we need a vibrant industrial base. Its competitiveness must also be a priority.

### Technology

One of our most demanding prerogatives is maintaining our current technological edge. We must continue, for example, to gauge the undersea warfare capability that over 200 attack submarines give the Soviets. As our strategy and the world order shift, we must refocus our technology on the changing threat. Technological superiority is nonnegotiable. It demands a vigorous research and development program which will permit us not only to compete with advanced mil-



itary technology, but also to strengthen our own technological base.

## Naval Forces in the New Post-Cold War Environment

Our budget goal is to balance the required reductions in our naval forces. Net adjustments will bring us to a future force of about 477 ships in fiscal year 1992, 464 ships in fiscal year 1993, and 451 ships in fiscal year 1995. Five force structure elements shape our reductions:

- 12 operational aircraft carriers to give us our required forward presence,
- enough amphibious ships to lift two and one-half marine Expeditionary Brigades,
- three smaller Marine Expeditionary Forces,
- 18 *TRIDENT* SSBNs,
- an appropriate balance of other ships, including about 150 surface combatants.

With 451 ships in peacetime, naval forces can do the following:

- sustain between two and three carriers forward deployed for presence and immediate crisis response,
- keep 14 SSNs deployed,
- keep between two and three amphibious ready groups, each with embarked Marines, on station,

- provide 25 to 30 surface combatants for forward presence,
- sustain these deployments indefinitely, using about 30 percent of all forces forward deployed,
- tailor forces for specific operational and political circumstances,
- quickly change geographic disposition,
- form carrier and amphibious strike forces and respond to emerging crises within one to seven days,
- sustain these levels for a prolonged period while providing the quality of life our sailors and Marines deserve.

## The Budget

We are adapting our forces and our support organizations, and we are carefully re-evaluating our traditional missions. Even as the unpredictability of the future has grown, fiscal pressures have reduced available resources. Remaining resources must be focused on capabilities that are achievable and applicable to the new security environment.

Department of the Navy resource reductions have been aggressively managed by a number of initiatives, many of them evolving from the Defense Management Review. Supply depots and depot-level maintenance, for example, have consolidated more functions, resulting in significant savings. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to absorb all of the required reductions by management initiatives alone. Much of the reduction must be absorbed by force structure, as previously discussed, drawing the fleet down to 451 ships in fiscal year 1995.

Personnel end strength is being reduced hand-in-hand with force structure reductions. Mandated military personnel levels could eventually drive the force of active ships actually below the number we can afford. Prudent and timely base closures will be imperative in order to balance our infrastructure with Fleet size. Fiscal year 1993 new-construction funding has been reduced to a minimum, pending the recommendations of the congressionally-chartered Defense Base Closure Commission.

We have terminated large acquisition programs, including the A-12 and P-7. The F/A-18 production rate has been reduced. Research and development of the Navy advanced tactical fighter has been terminated. Construction of the DDG-51 has been significantly reduced. Our *WASP*-class (LHD-1) multi-purpose amphibious assault ship program has been

reduced to five ships, and by fiscal year 1997, all of the *IWO JIMA* (LPH-2)-class amphibious assault ships will have been retired. The SSN-21 program has been scaled back. Construction of additional *TRIDENT* submarines has been terminated. The *TRIDENT* submarine back-fit program has been delayed, and procurement of the *TRIDENT* D-5 missile has been reduced accordingly. The MK-48 advanced capability torpedo program is being reduced to single-source production.

Funding for operating requirements related to Operation *DESERT STORM* is not reflected in the department's budget submission. Our tempo of operations is budgeted at historical levels in accordance with the budget summit decision to consider a supplemental appropriation for Operation *DESERT STORM* and track its expenses off-budget.

### Force and Manpower Levels

The number of our deployable battle force ships and the size of our Fleet Marine Forces decline through the budget



years. The budget request provides a total deployable battle force of 477 ships by the end of fiscal year 1992 and 464 ships by the end of fiscal year 1993.

New ships joining the battle force in fiscal year 1992 include three *AEGLIS* cruisers, one *AEGLIS* guided-missile destroyer, one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, one fast combat support ship, three mine warfare ships, one *TRIDENT* submarine, four nuclear-powered attack submarines, two amphibious warfare ships, two towed-array surveillance ships and four Military Sealift Command oilers.

New ships joining the battle force in fiscal year 1993 include three *AEGLIS* cruisers, two *AEGLIS* guided-missile destroyers, one fast combat support ship, one amphibious assault ship, four mine countermeasures ships, one *TRIDENT* submarine, three nuclear-powered attack submarines, one towed-array surveillance ship and three Military Sealift Command oilers. Also in fiscal year 1993, one conventionally-powered aircraft carrier rejoins the battle force after completing a service life extension program.

We inactivate 75 ships and transfer eight *KNOX*-class frigates to a non-deployable reserve status during fiscal year 1992. Thirty-two ships will be inactivated, and one mine warfare ship will transfer to a non-deployable reserve status during fiscal year 1993.

We have designed an "Innovative Naval Reserve Concept" to enhance our reserve ship mobilization base in a highly cost effective way. Eight *KNOX*-class, non-deployable reserve frigates will be "Type II" reserve training ships. Each will train its own selected reserve crew and four additional "Type III" reserve crews. These crews could reactivate 32 *KNOX*-class "Type III" hulls kept ready for sea within 180 days.

Average unit operating tempo during the budget years will remain unchanged at 50.5 underway days per quarter for deployed units and 23 days per quarter for non-deployed units.

The number of active Navy carrier air wings will decrease from 13 to 12 by fiscal year 1992 and to 11 in fiscal year 1993. The number of Navy reserve carrier air wings will remain at two. We will retain three active and one reserve Marine Corps air wings. The configuration of both Navy and Marine Corps air wings will continue to be restructured. Our flying hour program provides 85 percent primary mission readiness.

In the Marine Corps, we are deactivating eight rifle companies, a regimental headquarters, an artillery battalion, a tank battalion and an armored assault battalion. Marine aviation will deactivate an A-6 squadron and a KC-130 squadron.

We must continue to emphasize people as we transition to a smaller force. End strength will be significantly reduced in each of the first five years of the future years defense plan. We must ensure that the cuts we make do not result in hollow force structure and must work assiduously to avoid involuntary separations.

Our Total Force concept, adopted in 1973, was not combat tested until this year. Over 16,000 naval reservists and 31,000 Marine Corps reservists have been recalled to date. They include fleet hospitals, cargo handling battalions, Navy SEABEES and combat augmentation of the Marine Expeditionary Force. Every day of Operation *DESERT STORM* is providing insight into the benefits of reserve mobilization. A ready, properly sized reserve force will be critical to the shape of our future force structure.

The budget reduces Navy active duty end strength by 18,321 in fiscal year 1992 and 15,400 in fiscal year 1993, resulting in a total end strength of 536,000. The budget also reduces Marine Corps active duty end strength by 5,735 in fiscal year 1992 and 5,800 in fiscal year 1993, bringing end strength down to 182,200 by the end of fiscal year 1993.

Reductions also come from the conversion of 3,338 military billets to civilian billets in fiscal year 1992, with 5,006 more billets converted in fiscal year 1993. Our Department of the Navy civilian end strength declines by 29,783 in fiscal year 1992 and 37,220 in fiscal year 1993.

## Naval Aviation

On Aug. 2, 1990, when faced with the current military crisis, the President asked a familiar question: "Where are the carriers?" Within five days, two aircraft carrier battle groups were on station prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations. Two more were en route. We may never know if Saddam Hussein intended to continue into Saudi Arabia, but this initial show of resolve undoubtedly deterred Iraq from further incursions. Our carriers provided us the time required to build our political coalition and move our land-based military forces into theater. Today, six carriers are on station, and three more are on call.

Our carrier presence was no accident. *USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER* (CVN-69) was on station in the Mediterranean Sea. *USS INDEPENDENCE* (CV-62) was in the eastern



Indian Ocean in keeping with our historical deployment patterns. This response clearly demonstrates the wisdom of our national investment in carriers and their embarked air wings.

During fiscal year 1990, one new carrier, USS *ABRAHAM LINCOLN* (CVN-72), was commissioned, replacing the World War II vintage USS *CORAL SEA* (CV-43). Three additional carriers are currently under construction and will replace older carriers. By retaining a base force of 12 operational carriers, we will sustain a strategy of forward presence independent of uncertain foreign basing rights. We are committed to maintaining the staying power necessary to see a crisis through to a stable conclusion.

We have an equally important investment in embarked carrier air wings. Today six carrier air wings and one significantly reinforced Marine air wing are engaged in combat. The success of Operation *DESERT STORM* again attests to the wisdom of past priorities: aircraft modernization, weapons procurement, survivability and joint interoperability programs.


The need to adjust to a new strategy and the realities of fiscal constraints has required many difficult decisions. The A-12 and P-7 programs were cancelled due to inadequate contract performance.

Our fiscal year 1992 budget funds 36 F/A-18C/D aircraft and begins development of an F/A-18 range and payload upgrade targeted for fiscal year 1996 introduction. We are also working toward definition and acquisition of an A-6 replacement aircraft necessitated by the A-12 cancellation. Another key naval aviation research and development priority is Marine Corps medium lift replacement. We will continue modernizing our helicopter anti-submarine warfare capability, our logistics and counter-mine warfare capabilities, our combat search and rescue programs and our undergraduate pilot training. Our budget will fund an upgrade for three EA-6B *PROWLER* jets and begin the demonstration and validation phase of the next-generation attack aircraft.

## Surface Warfare

The opening salvo of Operation *DESERT STORM* heralded a new age in surface warfare. For the first time, inland strikes were conducted not only by Navy and Marine aircraft, but also by the *TOMAHAWK* cruise missile. It was launched in combat for the first time from ships of our surface force.

This capability is the result of nearly two decades of dedicated research and development. The investment we made in this technology permits us to attack well-defended strategic



targets with extreme accuracy. It preserves aircraft and their crews for missions which only manned aircraft can execute.

On the Fourth of July, our newest *AEGIS* combatant, the *ARLEIGH BURKE* (DDG-51) guided-missile destroyer, will enter the fleet. In addition to *ARLEIGH BURKE*, four other *AEGIS* destroyers are under construction. We have a total of 17 DDG-51-class ships under contract.

The *TICONDEROGA*-class *AEGIS* guided-missile cruiser has been one of the Navy's most successful acquisition programs. The 27th ship of this class is now under construction. Later this year the Navy will commission *COWPENS* (CG-63), *GETTYSBURG* (CG-64) and *HUE CITY* (CG-66).

Our budget for fiscal year 1992 includes five *ARLEIGH BURKE*-class guided-missile destroyers (DDG-51), one dock landing ship (cargo variant) (LSD(CV)), two coastal mine-hunters (MHC), one fast combat support ship (AOE), one oceanographic research ship (AGOR) and one survey ship (TAGS). Twelve landing craft air cushion (LCAC) are also budgeted.

Our budget for fiscal year 1993 includes four DDG-51s, one LSD (CV), two MHCs, one ocean surveillance ship

(TAGOS) and two TAGSs.

Sixteen DDG-51s are planned for procurement between fiscal year 1991 and fiscal year 1994.

## The Submarine Force

Our attack submarines have stealth, mobility, firepower and endurance. They conduct intelligence gathering and surveillance missions, sea and land strike warfare, anti-submarine warfare and special force operations.

The SSN-21 *SEAWOLF* submarine program will maintain this nation's undersea superiority. It will also undergird our power projection capability and carry our submarine force into the 21st century with a significant technological advantage. The SSN-21 will double the firepower of today's most advanced submarine. It will have the highest tactical speed, be able to incorporate future technology, and will be the quietest submarine in the world, at any speed. Our budget requests one SSN-21 per year in fiscal years 1992 and 1993, continuing at this rate through fiscal year 1995. SSN-21 will ensure that our future submarine force will be superior to today's force and capable of defeating any developing threat.

Our strategic submarine force provides nearly 50 percent of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads for about 25 percent of our total national strategic budget. Its enormous contribution to the strategic triad was expanded in 1990 by the deployment of the *TRIDENT II D-5* missile. This missile has improved accuracy, greater range, and larger payload, allowing our strategic submarines to engage the entire range of strategic targets. The 18th *TRIDENT* submarine, appropriated in fiscal year 1991, will be the last in its class.

## Marine Corps Programs

The Marine Corps lines in the budget will fund ammunition, tracked combat vehicles, armaments, missiles, communication and electronics equipment, support vehicles, engineering equipment and spare parts.

New equipment in fiscal year 1992 will include the Pedestal Mounted *STINGER*, Single Channel Ground and Air Radios (SINCGARS) and Night Vision Equipment. New equipment in fiscal year 1993 will include, among other items, the Advanced Anti-tank Weapons System--Medium (AAWS-M) and the Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS).

The Marine Corps ammunition budget also includes increased numbers of munitions such as small arms, mortar and artillery rounds, grenades and pyrotechnic devices.

## Sealift

Operation *DESERT SHIELD* gave us a unique opportunity to measure the performance of our nation's sealift. The sealift effort has been immensely successful. Sealift moved equipment and supplies more rapidly and over a greater distance than in any other crisis in history. Our success validates the wisdom of recent investments in sealift.

Despite our successes, not all elements of our sealift program performed as we planned. The performance of our Ready Reserve Force was the greatest deficiency. In retrospect, the activation times we set were probably unrealistic, and we obviously need to take a fresh look at the maintenance of these ships. Commercial charter ships played a vital role. These charters will continue to figure prominently in any future sealift efforts. Like ships in the Ready Reserve Force, however, charters are not available quickly enough to meet early delivery requirements.

We are participants in the Mobility Requirements Study in response to Congressional direction. It will nail down our sealift requirements and options. Meanwhile, we have concluded that additional roll-on/roll-off ships will almost certainly be required to improve the responsiveness of sealift. These ships would be well suited for maritime prepositioning, for a reduced operating status like that maintained by our fast sealift ships, or possibly for commercial charter.


In order to speed our acquisition responsiveness once the Mobility Requirements Study is completed, we have already begun a process leading to ship design, construction, or purchase of large, medium speed roll-on/roll off ships.

## Research and Development

Our ability to support U.S. national security objectives depends on our investments in research and development. We need technologically superior weapons systems to hedge against the future, when we anticipate that emerging regional powers will have first rate capabilities.

In the Department of the Navy, funds supporting full scale development of new systems grew by 60 percent from 1980 to 1990. Science and technology funding actually decreased over this same period. Our budget in the 1990s reverses this trend, putting greater emphasis on developing our scientific and technical base.

We recognize that we cannot afford to operate as many forces as we can build, and that we cannot build as many systems as we can develop. Given these conditions, it is clear that a firm technological foundation is the best way to main-



tain superior warfighting capabilities.

The nation's emphasis on a growing technology base requires support for our national technical and scientific infrastructure. Basic research at universities and corporate laboratories is likewise essential to our nation's future scientific and technological advances, including training our future scientists and engineers. Our basic research programs currently emphasize the ocean sciences, advanced materials and information sciences.

Our exploratory development program funds basic research and gives it the technical maturity necessary to apply it to the Fleet and the Fleet Marine Force. It emphasizes technical areas with the greatest potential payoff consistent with warfare requirements. We have placed particular emphasis on the changing threat, low-intensity conflict, shallow water anti-submarine warfare, local area air defense, and advanced amphibious assault.

In 1990, we combined our advanced technology development program with our technology base efforts. The Chief of Naval Research is now responsible for both. These programs develop science and technology with the most promising naval applications. Our emphasis is shifting, however, more toward Advanced Technology Demonstrations, direct involvement of industry, expediting startup times for new initiatives and selection of high-risk/high-payoff projects for changing Fleet and Fleet Marine Force requirements.

In the budget for fiscal year 1992, growth occurs in the technology base, in defense-wide mission support, in ad-

vanced technology development and in strategic programs. These increases are offset by a decline in tactical programs caused by the decline in the number of systems entering full scale development. There is also growth in fiscal year 1993 from increases in tactical programs. These programs include F/A-18 improvements, surface ship electric drive, anti-submarine warfare system improvements and the next generation attack aircraft.

## Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve

The events of the past six months have resulted in the most active role for our Navy and Marine Corps reserve forces in the past 40 years.

In the Naval Reserve, the recall for Operation *DESERT SHIELD* and Operation *DESERT STORM* has drawn heavily on medical personnel. These reservists are being used largely to fill gaps in hospitals in the United States, but some medical reservists are also serving in theater. Our stateside medical facilities lost many active-duty staff members when fleet hospital units deployed and the hospital ships USNS *MERCY* (T-AH-19) and USNS *COMFORT* (T-AH-20) sailed for the Persian Gulf. These ships were among the first deployed to Operation *DESERT SHIELD* in August 1990.

Our reserve specialists in Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare (MIUW) units are serving in the Persian Gulf, providing harbor security and surveillance. The entire MIUW force is in the Naval Reserve. Their employment illustrates the Navy's reliance on reserve personnel for a vital operational capability. Naval Reserve minesweepers are in the Persian Gulf, and reservists are manning the Military Sealift Command detachments which provide intra-theater sealift support. Reserve naval control of shipping units provide scheduling, routing and liaison support.

The "Innovative Naval Reserve Concept" will be part of an expanded mobilization force. These ships will be dedicated exclusively to training, and designated FFTs.

In the budget, Naval Reserve forces are declining. The number of Naval Reserve force ships will decline from 54 in fiscal year 1991, to 40 in fiscal year 1992, and to 37 in fiscal year 1993. Our Naval Reserve air force will likewise decline: from 610 aircraft in fiscal year 1991, to 575 aircraft in fiscal year 1992, and to 552 aircraft in fiscal year 1993. Operating tempo will be reduced from 21 days per quarter in fiscal year 1991 to 18 days per quarter in fiscal years 1992 and 1993. Naval Air Reserve primary mission readiness will be 87 percent through the budget years.

As Marine Corps forces moved into Saudi Arabia, Marine



Corps reservists began to play a crucial role in sustaining our active force. The Marine Corps Reserve provides a source for combat units and individual mobilization augmentees. The reserves are structured, equipped, and trained to reinforce the Fleet Marine Force. They provide the Marine Corps with great strategic flexibility, supporting multiple operational commitments and lengthy sustainment.

Reserve Marine individual mobilization augmentees fill critical billets in the supporting establishment and have been a great resource in Operation *DESERT SHIELD* and Operation *DESERT STORM*. These Marines have manned crisis cells, provided communications support and conducted airfield operations.

Since October, a number of selected Marine Corps Reserve units have been ordered to active duty. Some of them have filled vacancies created by deploying active units, while others have deployed to the Persian Gulf.

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve is also active in the war against illegal drugs and in disaster assistance. Marines have supported our counternarcotics joint task forces in the southern United States and in the Caribbean. During natural disasters, Marine Air Reserve forces have flown rescue missions, and provided logistics and communications support to the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

## Anti-Submarine Warfare

With changes in the world order and our own strategy, it is appropriate to re-examine the top-priority emphasis we have previously placed on countering the Soviet submarine threat. Although there has been no observed reduction of Soviet submarine capabilities, Soviet deployment patterns have significantly changed. Accordingly, anti-submarine warfare investment can once again proceed at a more measured pace, with particular emphasis on research and development. Clearly, our anti-submarine warfare capabilities and potential must be maintained to defend against any change in Soviet intentions.

Meanwhile, the proliferation of submarine technology in the Third World adds a new challenge. We will have to counter quiet, modern non-nuclear submarines in shallow and littoral waters to support power projection operations. It will be one of our toughest problems in the future. Although anti-submarine warfare no longer ranks as the Navy's number one warfighting priority, it will still be one of our top operational requirements.

## C3I

In Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

(C3I) and space warfare, our research and development program for combat data link, the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), has met all reliability requirements in the first phase of operational testing. The Multi-Functional Information Distribution System (MIDS) (a NATO effort to build a smaller version of JTIDS) has completed program definition phase. MIDS is designed for smaller tactical aircraft, including the F/A-18. The Enhanced Modular Signal Processor (EMSP) program has delivered its first engineering development model. Major software development tools have been provided to the users. A concept and program plan were also developed for Space-Based Wide Area Surveillance.

Major acquisitions are underway in satellite communications. Procurement continues for extremely high frequency (EHF) satellite terminals used with the *MILSTAR* and ultra high frequency (UHF) follow-on satellite systems. We will procure and deploy nine UHF follow-on satellites, of which six will have EHF packages.

In direct support of Operation *DESERT SHIELD* and Operation *DESERT STORM*, our *NAVSTAR* satellite global positioning system has proven to be extremely valuable. We can derive accurate geographical positions independent of terrain. This system has given us a distinct tactical advantage in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

## Counternarcotics Operations

We remain committed to detect and counter illegal drugs. Through joint operations and in cooperation with law enforcement agencies, we are preventing, disrupting and deterring illegal drug distribution and use.

Testing, education, detection and enforcement within the Navy and Marine Corps have reduced our incidence of drug abuse to about 1 percent.

Since 1981, the Department of the Navy has steadily increased support for law enforcement agencies, within the law and federal regulations. Our sailors and Marines play a prominent role in detecting and monitoring the movement of illegal drugs into the United States. The critical integration of C3I support for counternarcotics operations has greatly increased the effectiveness of this program. Sailors and Marines are involved in anti-drug operations with Joint Task Force 4 in Key West, Fla.; Joint Task Force 5 in Alameda, Calif.; and Joint Task Force 6 in El Paso, Texas. The Department of the Navy assists law enforcement efforts with training, facilities, logistics, maintenance, communications, and equipment. We provide E-2C *HAWKEYE* aircraft to the Coast Guard and P-3C *ORION* maritime patrol aircraft to the U.S. Customs Service.

Since 1982, Navy ships have embarked United States Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments while providing most of the ships in the joint U.S. Caribbean Squadron. It is this squadron that conducts drug interdiction operations near drug source countries and in choke points.

Over 100 Department of the Navy personnel are presently assigned to anti-drug positions in other agencies including the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the State Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

### **Defense Management Report Progress**

The Department of the Navy strongly supports the Defense Management Review process. The Defense Management Report came from an intensive internal management review started in 1989. Consistent with its initiatives, our agenda for change will improve our acquisition process and more effectively manage limited resources.

We are currently implementing the provisions of the Defense Management Report, the Secretary of Defense Management Report Directives, and internal Department of the Navy initiatives. We will consolidate and reduce oversight, enhance decision authority and accountability of program managers and program executive officers, reduce infrastruc-


ture, find efficiencies in procurement and improve the acquisition system.

### **Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition)**

We have streamlined oversight of acquisition by creating the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition. The ASN (RDA) is responsible for research, development, procurement and information resources. He is the Navy acquisition executive, senior procurement executive, and information resource management official.

The Department of the Navy has also substantially reorganized its acquisition management structure. We have six program executive officers separate from Navy systems commands, along with five program managers for major acquisition programs reporting directly to the ASN (RDA). We are continuing to review and evaluate our management structure to identify additional improvements and efficiencies.

In reorganizing acquisition management, decision authority and accountability are clearly vested in line managers and are exercised at the lowest appropriate level. We have reduced the secretariat staff for acquisition review and oversight by



more than 20 percent. Neither the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations nor that of the Commandant of the Marine Corps are directly involved in program acquisition activities.

We have moved aggressively to implement cost savings from both the Defense Management Review process and our own internal reviews. These initiatives include cost-saving reductions in the supply system and depot-level maintenance efficiencies. We have improved fiscal accounting and control and we have standardized our automated data processing systems. We have also improved the efficiency of Navy Industrial Fund activities including shipyards, aviation depots and laboratories.

We will continue to focus on finding additional potential efficiencies in our procurement process because management review is not a one-time effort. It requires constant improvement of management by reducing overhead and infrastructure costs while enhancing weapons system performance. As we reduce the infrastructure and realize cost savings, we must continue to maintain the highest standards. Moreover, if we can lower support costs simply by reducing the cost of doing business, we will reduce the impact of the current fiscal environment.



## **Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment)**

Also as part of the Defense Management Review initiatives, the Department of the Navy reorganization has included the establishment of the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment. This action strengthens our management of the shore establishment and develops environmental, safety and occupational health programs to support our operating forces.

### **Environment**

Our fiscal year 1992 budget request reflects an increase in environmental funding, demonstrating our commitment to environmental concerns. We are determined to promote an ethic of environmental protection.

To control shipboard pollution, we are installing hardware to remove oil from bilge discharges. Shipboard trash compactors and solid waste pulpers will be purchased in fiscal year 1992. We recently completed a demonstration project that converted 13 tons of ships' plastic waste into park benches. We are pursuing methods to conserve or replace chemicals used in firefighting and other naval operations.

Sixty percent of our shore installations have recycling programs; the rest will have them by the end of this calendar year. We collected over \$12 million from recycling last year and used the money to support morale, welfare and recreation programs.

Because most Navy and Marine Corps bases are on coastal lands, we have custody of some of the nation's most sensitive ecosystems. We have joined with other conservation organizations to establish natural resource conservation programs. Last September, we established the first watchable wildlife area within the Department of Defense at the Naval Communications Unit in Cutler, Maine.

We clean up hazardous waste sites on Navy and Marine Corps installations using funds from the Defense Environmental Restoration Account. Our fiscal year 1992 funding for cleanup represents a 47 percent increase over fiscal year 1991.

We have also revised our procurement practices to minimize environmental pollution. We have removed or reduced plastic packaging on over 70,000 items in our supply system, and we are strictly limiting our inventory of hazardous material. We are also introducing recycled steel grit and plastic beads to remove old paint, instead of using toxic chemical methods.



### **Infrastructure Ashore**

All of our budget priorities are reflected in our shore infrastructure. Our goal is to have quality facilities supporting a quality force.

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 gives us an opportunity to adjust our shore infrastructure. Reductions in our force structure mean reduced requirements for our shore bases. We have begun a review of our entire shore establishment, aggressively pursuing the base closure and realignment process. We expect to identify several candidate bases in the near future. At those bases, we will take every step possible to alleviate local economic hardship and personal turbulence.

### **Total Quality Leadership**

The Department of the Navy is charting its future along a new path of management innovation and systems integration. We are strategically planning for a more productive organizational structure using the guidelines of Total Quality Leadership (TQL).

TQL provides the conceptual basis for examining everything supported by the department's infrastructure, both shore-based and operational. Through a process of top-down guidance and implementation, TQL translates the present and future needs of the Navy and the Marine Corps directly into

working processes. Work procedures, policies, equipment, training, and all organizational factors are worthwhile only when they add value to our ultimate customers, our sailors and Marines.

TQL focuses on the enormous power of naval leadership to foster the productive potential of our people, many of whom are stifled by the "red tape" of large bureaucracies. TQL calls for our top leaders to examine the systems supporting their organizations. Our leaders will strive less to control all decisions and enforce policy than they will to help others develop their own decision-making abilities.

Quality leaders lead their people toward even greater capabilities by investing in ongoing training and individual development. In the Navy and Marine Corps, this means our commitment to training and readiness of the operating forces. Our quality personnel will be able to meet the challenges of an unpredictable future.

### **Conclusion**

Our international security environment is changing. We face a different complexion of threats throughout the world. There is still the potential for superpower confrontation with the Soviet Union. Our own naval policy and strategy are in an evolutionary stage. We are responding not only to strategic reality, but also to fiscal reality, making real reductions in our defense budget.

The challenge for the Navy and Marine Corps is to meet the defense needs of the nation in the future as we are doing today in Operation *DESERT STORM*. We will continue our contributions to strategic deterrence, forward presence, and crisis response. We will support a strong infrastructure to reconstitute forces we might need if changes in the Soviet Union require them. Above all, we will take care of our people.

Our American way of life and the guiding direction of the new world order are at stake. The Navy and the Marine Corps must be structured to do whatever is necessary to protect our national interests around the world. Within the context of continued democratic evolution in the Soviet Union, we are committed to change and force reductions, not just for the sake of making defense cuts, but because change makes sense. We will not reduce our capabilities to the point where risk to our nation's interests becomes unacceptable. We are going about changing our strategy and force structure intelligently, so that we can respond with naval forces wherever necessary. Our Navy and Marine Corps of the future will meet these challenges. Our forces will be sufficient in quality and warfighting capability to fulfill our responsibility to the nation.



**Admiral Frank B. Kelso II**  
**United States Navy**  
**Chief Of Naval Operations**

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, a native of Fayetteville, Tenn., attended public school and the University of the South in Sewanee, Tenn., prior to entering the U.S. Naval Academy in 1952. Following graduation in 1956, he served in the cargo ship USS *OGLETHORPE* (AKA 100) before attending submarine school in 1958.

On completion of training, he was assigned to the submarine USS *SABALO* (SS 302) before returning to submarine school for nuclear power training in January 1960. He then served one year in the Nuclear Power Department at the school. Subsequent tours included the precommissioning crew of USS *POLLACK* (SSN 603), engineering officer aboard USS *DANIEL WEBSTER* (SSBN 626) and executive officer of USS *SCULPIN* (SSN 590).

From January 1969 to August 1971, he served as commanding officer, U.S. Naval Nuclear Power School in Bainbridge, Md. Following tours included commanding officer, USS *FINBACK* (SSN 670); staff of Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; and commanding officer, USS *BLUEFISH* (SSN 675). Admiral Kelso was then assigned as executive assistant to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic from September 1975 to July 1977.

He served as Commander, Submarine Squadron 7 until reporting as division director, Submarine Distribution Divi-



sion in the Naval Military Personnel Command, and section head of the Submarine Programs Section in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel and Training) in September 1978. He was selected for promotion to the rank of rear admiral in February 1980.

Upon selection for flag rank, Admiral Kelso served as Director, Strategic Submarine Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and then was assigned as Director, Office of Program Appraisal, Office of the Secretary of the Navy. On Feb. 8, 1985, Admiral Kelso became Commander Sixth Fleet and NATO Commander Naval Striking Force and Support Forces Southern Europe. On June 30, 1986, Admiral Kelso was promoted to admiral and assumed the duties of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Admiral Kelso became Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command Nov. 22, 1988. He became the Navy's 24th Chief of Naval Operations June 29, 1990.

Admiral Kelso has been awarded the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Navy Distinguished Service Medal (three awards), Legion of Merit (four awards), Meritorious Service, Navy Commendation and Navy Achievement Medals.

He is married to the former Landess McCown of Florence, S.C. They have four children: Thomas, attending medical school; Donald, a Navy lieutenant; Mary, married to a Navy Lieutenant; and Kerry, a student attending college.

## Posture Statement by the Chief of Naval Operations

### Table of Contents

The Winds of Change .....	22	Maritime Patrol and ASW Aircraft .....	35
Strategic Constants .....	23	Jet Trainer Program .....	35
Changing U.S. Strategies .....	23	Submarine Fleet of the Future .....	36
A New Defense Policy.....	23	Surface Fleet of the Future .....	36
Joint and Combined Operations .....	24	Strategic Sealift .....	38
Employing Naval Forces .....	25	Space and Electronic Warfare .....	39
Regional Operations .....	25	Oceanography .....	39
Technology .....	26	Navy Manpower .....	39
Operations <i>Desert Shield</i> and		Quality of Life .....	39
<i>Desert Storm</i> .....	26	Operations <i>Desert Shield</i> and <i>Desert Storm</i> ...	40
What is the Way Ahead? .....	27	Officer Accessions .....	40
Key Components of		Selective Early Retirement .....	40
Maritime Superiority .....	28	Recruiting .....	40
More Than Numbers .....	30	Naval Reserve Force .....	40
Constancy and Change .....	31	Recall .....	40
		Naval Reserve Reductions .....	41
Appendix: Building the Future Force --		NRF Surface Forces .....	41
The Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Navy Budget		Naval Reserve Aviation .....	41
A Force for the Future .....	32	Medical Care .....	42
Deployment Considerations .....	32	Environment .....	42
Force Calculations .....	33	Environmental Awareness .....	42
Promoting Regional Stability .....	33	Base Closures and Reductions .....	42
Responding to Regional Conflicts.....	33	Pillars .....	42
Hedging against Global Conflict .....	34	Force Structure .....	42
Modernizing the Force for the Future ....	34	Readiness .....	43
Carrier Force Levels .....	34	Sustainability .....	43
Carrier Air Wing of the Future .....	34	Modernization .....	43
		A Balanced and Flexible Force .....	43

# **A Report by Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II Chief of Naval Operations on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget of the U.S. Navy**

The past year has witnessed a fundamental shift in the post-World War II political and military balance. Changes in the political and security environment which were only dimly evident a year ago have come more sharply into focus in the last few months. The close of the cold war, the unification of Germany and our evolving relationship with the Soviet Union and its former allies in Eastern Europe have resulted in growing mutual interests with these nations on a broad range of issues. These changes have been highlighted by events in Southwest Asia, where the Soviet Union and many East European states now support the position and actions of the international coalition and the U.N. resolutions concerning Iraq.

Through perseverance and sacrifice, the United States and its allies have begun to realize the fundamental goals for Eastern Europe which we pursued so steadfastly throughout


the cold war -- freedom and national self-determination. Our rapid response to aggression in Kuwait, with a major transfer of U.S. military might into the Persian Gulf region, demonstrates our continuing commitment to these principles. Unfortunately, the necessity for U.S. military operations in Panama, Liberia, Somalia and the Persian Gulf in the past year has also proven that the end of the cold war has not eliminated instability and the need for U.S. involvement.

Clearly, we live in a time that is fraught with both opportunity and danger. Our response to these challenges will determine, in large measure, our status as a world leader in the 21st century. It is now time to re-examine many of our earlier ground rules and assumptions. Some will remain valid, others will need to be reshaped to respond to new requirements. Elements of naval force structure, strategy, tactics, and operating patterns based primarily on the concept of global war with the Soviet Union will have to be focused on maintaining stability in many regions with economic and politically uncertain futures. One thing is clear -- we must seize the initiative in responding to this new environment.

## **The Winds of Change**

Today, the threat from the Soviet Union has diminished significantly. Beset by a wide range of fundamental economic and political problems, the Soviets have eased their iron grip on Eastern Europe and haltingly begun the first tentative steps toward democratization and a market economy. The military consequences are significant. It is now very unlikely that the Soviet Union could launch a conventional attack on the U.S. or its allies without an extensive period of forewarning. However, the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal makes it the only nation capable of threatening our national existence. Both of these factors must be accounted for in our planning for the future.

In the past, we have argued strongly that we must base our plans and force structure on the capabilities of our potential foes, not on their intentions. Certainly, given the enormous amount of time and resources necessary to develop and field modern naval forces, this has been a prudent approach. Good intentions can change very quickly; capabilities do not. While we recognize the importance of the changes in Eastern



Europe and hope for continued improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, recent events in the Baltic republics and unresolved arms control issues make it prudent that we continue to hedge against possible Soviet retrenchment.

There are, moreover, other factors we must consider when developing our strategy to cope with a changing world. A growing number of countries are acquiring increasingly sophisticated military capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction and the means to employ them over great distances. We are likely to see increasing limitations on U.S. access to foreign bases. Military operations will probably include forces from our traditional allies and from nations with whom we share no alliance, but with whom we have common interests. And, finally, we must expect that fiscal pressures at home will affect the level of future defense spending.

Despite dramatic shifts in the geopolitical environment, the United States remains the world's preeminent military and economic power. However, this fact alone has not been sufficient to deter conflict. The world has not yet progressed to the point where we can count on the good intentions of individual countries and leaders to maintain peace and prosperity for all. Nor can we rely solely on the moral suasion of international law to limit aggression and illegal action. We must accept that, in a world marked by conflicting political, social, and economic systems, there will always be those who consider their interests at odds with our own. Iraq justified its invasion of Kuwait in terms of longstanding territorial claims. Throughout the world today there are many similar irredentist claims, territorial disputes and social and religious conflicts which have the potential to erupt and threaten important U.S. interests.

## Strategic Constants

Regardless of the uncertainty surrounding the future, it is clear that America's fundamental goals and interests remain unchanged: to defend the United States, its people and their interests; to contribute to a global environment of improving economic conditions; to promote political stability; and to foster individual freedom and self-determination.

Geography is another constant -- the United States will remain a maritime nation, dependent upon the seas for commerce, defense and links to its overseas allies. The Navy will, therefore, retain its traditional importance as a primary means of protecting and projecting U.S. interests around the globe.

Today, the U.S. Navy has the forces to support national policy in a superpower confrontation as well as the capability to respond immediately to even the most distant threat to regional stability. These forces represent the culmination of

two decades of planning and investment and will influence strongly the structure of the Navy for the next 20 years. Our *AEGIS* cruisers and destroyers, *TRIDENT* ballistic missile submarines, modern attack submarines, aircraft carriers, and weapons such as the *TOMAHAWK* cruise missile are part of a Navy that stands at the leading edge of technology.

Technological supremacy alone, however, does not ensure security. The strength of the Navy throughout its history has been the dedication, professionalism, and quality of our people. Our requirement to recruit, train and retain the best of our nation's youth will not change as we look to the challenges of the next decade.


## Changing U.S. Strategies

In response to these fundamental shifts in the national security environment, the United States and the Navy have begun to adapt their strategies to this new set of circumstances.


### A New Defense Policy

In his address at Aspen, Colo., Aug. 2, 1990, the President stated that future U.S. defense policy will be based on four major elements: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and force reconstitution. Maritime superiority over any potential adversary remains an indispensable underpinning for each of these elements of national security.

Deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, costs less than any level of conflict, and will remain the cornerstone of U.S.







defense policy. Nuclear deterrence will be required as long as any country possesses the capability to strike the United States or endanger U.S. forces abroad with nuclear weapons.

The ability to maintain capable naval forces in potential crisis areas throughout the world is essential to U.S. security. In addition to helping deter local conflict, forward-deployed forces demonstrate commitment and support for our friends without having to rely on increasingly scarce overseas bases. Our ability to affect events and deter conflict is greatly enhanced by the presence of forces at the scene of the potential disturbance. Should deterrence fail, these forces enable us to respond rapidly to contain a crisis.

When crises do occur, naval forces can be positioned quickly to signal intent and support regional allies. Powerful and self-contained, they can project power ashore and influence events anywhere in the world. Just in the past year, U.S. naval forces have reacted on short notice to protect American lives and support U.S. interests in Central America, Africa and the Persian Gulf. In Operation *SHARP EDGE*, naval forces remained off the coast of Liberia for two months before being called upon to evacuate over 350 Americans and 1,500 citizens of other countries. In Operation *EASTERN EXIT*, forces were diverted from duties in the North Arabian Sea to rescue 260 U.S. and foreign diplomats from Somalia. And in Operation *DESERT SHIELD* naval forces have provided forward presence, enforced U.N. economic sanctions, and expanded significantly the combat capabilities available to the theater commander.

An uncertain future also requires that we be able to reconstitute forces if the global situation changes once again. Fortunately, the decreased likelihood of a major conflict also provides increased strategic warning, thereby allowing us to place greater reliance upon forces maintained at lower readiness levels. For example, we plan to place 25 percent of our surface ASW forces, designed primarily for convoy escort missions, in an inactive reserve status, ready to be reactivated within 180 days.

Under these guidelines from the President, we have focused our long-range force structure planning on a smaller, but still potent, Navy of approximately 450 ships. This number represents a capability to respond to regional threats against U.S. interests and a hedge against a resurgent global threat.

### Joint and Combined Operations

As the size of U.S. military forces declines, greater emphasis will be placed on integrating the complementary capabilities of each of our military services to meet specific situations. Crisis response operations to protect worldwide U.S. interests will increasingly be joint in nature. The unique missions and functional capabilities of the services are intended to be complementary, enabling and enhancing. Properly employed, joint forces provide us with the means to generate the greatest total combat capability in the shortest time. Forward-deployed naval forces, for example, can arrive on scene quickly and conduct sustained operations. They provide for initial defense and play an important enabling role, covering the introduction of heavy ground and air forces. If a lodg-

ment ashore is not available, Navy and Marine forces have the ability to seize and hold territory, opening the way for follow-on forces.

In the future, we will also place greater emphasis on the potential contributions of other nations. Collective security remains central to U.S. strategy. In the past, our primary security ties and operations centered on countries with whom we maintained formal alliances. Such alliances remain a strategic necessity, but we also may see other forms of international security cooperation. The coalition of states allied in support of Operation *DESERT STORM* may be more representative of future security arrangements that will complement longstanding treaties such as NATO. To support growing international cooperation, we must increase our training with other navies -- both to facilitate cooperation and coordination and to maintain our own expertise in likely operating environments.

### Employing Naval Forces

During the coming decade, deployed naval forces will still perform their traditional missions of deterrence, routine presence and crisis response. Their ability to support U.S. interests, whether through subtle diplomacy or military action, makes them particularly relevant in a world where the maintenance of regional stability is a primary concern. However, they will increasingly be called upon to perform such missions as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, counter-narcotics operations and peacekeeping.

It will not be easy to determine just how much presence may be required in a given region at a given time. It is clear, however, that we can no longer plan our deployments on traditional assumptions of cold war confrontation. Reduced U.S.-Soviet tensions will allow greater freedom in deployment patterns and the shifting of forces among theaters in response to world events.

In the future, meeting presence requirements with fewer assets will call for full exploitation of the mobility and flexibility of our naval forces. That means changing the length and location of deployments, as well as tailoring the composition of carrier battle groups, amphibious forces and surface action groups to specific circumstances.

Whatever the nature of our changing security environment, national decision makers will continue to rely heavily on naval forces. Because of their proximity, sustainability, staying power, independence from bases ashore and robust combat capabilities, naval forces will be among the first called in a crisis. However, lower force levels and alternative deployment patterns will require that these forces begin moving toward potential trouble spots earlier.

### Regional Operations

*DESERT SHIELD* and *DESERT STORM* are unique operations in many respects and do not represent the only scenarios we could expect. For example, we were fortunate to be able to use a very highly developed port and airfield infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, which would probably not be available in other regional scenarios. We must ensure that our naval forces are flexible enough to meet the demands of an uncertain future. Operations to support regional stability will place greater emphasis on power projection -- carrier air strikes, amphibious operations, and cruise missiles. At the same time, local sea control will remain a prerequisite to projecting power ashore.

Control of the air, sea, and undersea environments essential to successful military operations on land will take on a different character but certainly will be as complex as maintaining control in an open-ocean environment. Sensors and communications systems designed for blue-water operations may not work as well in confined areas, shallow seas or over land. The threats posed by small coastal patrol boats, shore-launched cruise missiles, and shallow-water mines will present new challenges to our operators. Quick-reaction combat capabilities and the ability to maintain an accurate and timely



tactical picture will be critical for operational success in these littoral areas.

### Technology

Technology is changing the face of modern warfare, and the U.S. Navy is at the leading edge of this movement. Since ships and aircraft often have lifetimes of over 30 years, adapting the best of new technologies to proven concepts and platforms holds the most promise for meeting the challenges of the next decade. Developments in precision guidance, satellite navigation, cruise missiles, advanced radars, stealth technology, and worldwide communications have already been incorporated into the Navy's force structure and tactics.

We must ensure that, as technology evolves, we use it to our best advantage. The technological gap between our forces and those of our potential adversaries almost certainly will narrow, but we must never lose our comparative edge. Low observables, fiber optics, counter-stealth, improved weapon seekers, unmanned vehicles, netted high-speed computers, and advanced command, control and communications systems are some of the promising areas we are exploring.

### Operations *DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM*

The current conflict in the Persian Gulf region is a particularly illuminating example of the Navy's ability to respond to crisis. Since the outset of Operation *DESERT SHIELD*, naval forces in the Persian Gulf region have been a major instrument for bringing international pressure to bear on Iraq. The role of enforcing U.N. economic sanctions has rested primarily upon U.S. and allied naval units, which have challenged over 7,100 ships and boarded over 860. This interdiction operation has eliminated seaborne trade to and from Iraq. When the decision was made to move a deterrent force to support Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, local sea control -- an indispensable prerequisite for power projection -- was established quickly by two forward-deployed carrier battle groups. A review of the joint response in the first month after the invasion illustrates the contributions of naval forces.

**Aug. 2** Iraq invades Kuwait. Eight forward-deployed U.S. Navy ships of the Middle East Force -- including one guided-missile cruiser, one amphibious support ship, one *TOMAHAWK*-armed destroyer, four guided-missile frigates and one frigate -- are on station from the opening of the operation.

**Aug. 7** First Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPS) ships carrying combat equipment and stores for a Marine Expeditionary

Brigade depart Diego Garcia for the Persian Gulf. Three Fast Sealift Ships are activated and ordered to report to CONUS ports of embarkation to pick up designated Army units.

**Aug. 8** Five additional fast sealift ships are activated and directed to U.S. ports of embarkation. Two carrier battle groups arrive on station within striking range of Iraq: one in the North Arabian Sea and the other in the Mediterranean.

**Aug. 9** Afloat prepositioning (PREPO) ships carrying Army and Air Force ammunition and supplies get under way from Diego Garcia and the Mediterranean.

**Aug. 15** First three MPS ships arrive in the Persian Gulf.

**Aug. 17** First PREPO ships arrive in Persian Gulf ports.

**Aug. 20** Marine Corps combat units, flown into Saudi Arabia by the Military Airlift Command, marry up with heavy equipment and supplies brought in by MPS ships.

**Aug. 23** Two additional carrier battle groups and a battleship arrive on station.

**Aug. 27** Fast sealift ships begin to arrive, providing equipment for major elements of an Army mechanized division and an infantry brigade.

**Sept. 5** A U.S. Navy Amphibious Ready Group arrives in the area with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit.

While it is still too early to reach any final conclusions about the performance of naval forces in Operation *DESERT STORM*, several preliminary observations can be made. The ability of the Navy to augment the eight ships of the Middle East Force with two carrier battle groups within days of the invasion of Kuwait validates our strategy of forward deployment. This presence guaranteed free use of the seas for the vast amount of men and material which has followed. In addition, the maritime prepositioning squadron ships in the region enabled the Marine Corps to put a significant deterrent force on the ground in Saudi Arabia within two weeks of the

## Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM)



Iraqi invasion. In short, U.S. naval forces helped provide for the introduction of airborne forces, tactical air forces, and heavy ground units to the region.

Once the conflict began, the ability of naval forces to integrate with other services and allies to project power and to affect events ashore added a critical dimension to the coalition effort. In particular, the ability of U.S. carrier aircraft to assist in the establishment of air superiority and to bring accurate and lethal firepower to bear throughout the theater of operations has been a key part of the coalition response to Iraqi aggression and has provided a significant share of the coalition's strike capability to date. Additionally, the accuracy and range of the Navy's *TOMAHAWK* cruise missiles has added a new dimension to naval warfare and has enabled ships and submarines to complement effectively our strike aircraft.

Throughout the entire operation, it has been clear that the motivation, training, and quality of our people provided us a


critical edge. More than any weapon system, the outstanding performance of our men and women have been *the* success story of Operation *DESERT STORM*. From time to time, we discuss whether the emphasis we place on readiness and training can be reduced in order to save funds. If there has ever been a clearer justification of this commitment to readiness than our success in Operation *DESERT STORM* -- the effective interdiction of Iraq, the rapid attainment of air supremacy, the close coordination of *TOMAHAWK* strikes, and the low attrition of our aircraft -- I am not aware of it. I am absolutely convinced that the dollars we invest in realistic training, especially for steaming days and flying hours, reaps enormous benefits in lives, material, and overall combat capability. The current conflict in Southwest Asia is simply the latest example which proves this point.

### What is the Way Ahead?

To maintain our hard-earned position as the most modern

and capable naval force in the world today, we must meet the following near-term requirements:

- We must ensure that the forces we plan for the next decade are affordable in an era of diminishing defense funding.
- We must ensure that the forces which will replace our present ships and aircraft are capable of performing required missions.
- We must maintain an adequate industrial base to ensure efficient procurement and maintenance of the next gen-



eration of platforms and systems, and adequate shore infrastructure for surge capacity in times of conflict.

- We must ensure that we keep our technology advantage.
- And we must maintain the quality of life and high morale of our people.

These are formidable challenges. Nonetheless, the Department of the Navy is pursuing a number of specific measures which will provide us with a clearer picture of the way ahead.

The fiscal realities of the 1990s have made the development and acquisition of affordable weapon systems and platforms an increasingly important factor in sustaining our maritime strength. We also are refocusing leadership and management efforts to help us reduce the costs of operating our forces. We have begun the implementation of Total Quality Leadership (TQL), an approach which is already widespread in many areas of the naval shore establishment and some areas of civilian industry, to improve our use of the contributions made by our intelligent and innovative people. We strive to improve the quality of life and quality of work throughout the Navy.

We must make these changes with a cautious eye toward the need to maintain overall quality in our investment in people and equipment. We can neither retain our people nor operate safely unless we maintain a continued commitment to quality in the work place, both at sea and ashore. Equally important is the need to train our people in realistic, challenging environments. We intend to do this by increasing our reliance upon simulators and shore-based trainers while continuing to support an acceptable level of training at sea and in the air. Our recent successes in Operations *DESERT SHIELD* and *DESERT STORM* are a direct result of the training we have provided our young men and women.

We must never forget that naval operations take place in an inherently dangerous environment. We are working hard to address the hazards associated with our profession. The number of naval personnel who died in operational accidents declined almost 30 percent from 1989 to 1990, while the fiscal year 1990 aviation accident rate of 1.96 per 100,000 flight hours was the lowest on record. Nevertheless, we will not be satisfied until our safety record is perfect.

### Key Components of Maritime Superiority

To meet the demands of our national security strategy, we need naval forces that possess a wide range of capabilities. These must include: sea-based strategic forces, for continued



deterrence of nuclear attack; surge forces that can react rapidly to any crisis; forward-deployed expeditionary forces capable of going anywhere, with full logistic, medical, and repair support; and a sea-based maritime prepositioned force.

The Navy's ballistic missile submarines are an integral element of the U.S. nuclear triad. A force of 18 *TRIDENT* submarines will provide a survivable, cost effective nuclear response capability well into the next century. Similarly, U.S. attack submarines provide both nuclear and conventional deterrence by countering sea-based platforms that might threaten the United States or its allies. We must continue to maintain our strong technological edge in the critical areas of ASW and submarine operations. This does not require a massive building program. Maintaining our current SSN force through its programmed service life, together with a construction program adequate to maintain our industrial base for building submarines, will meet this requirement in the short term.

The centerpiece of our balanced power projection forces remains the carrier battle group. Each battle group is composed of an aircraft carrier, surface combatants, and possibly one or more nuclear attack submarines. These forces are supported by combat logistic ships, land-based maritime patrol aircraft, and sophisticated space-based surveillance and communications systems. They can be ready on short notice to conduct full combat operations anywhere in the world. We will need a force of at least 12 carriers and about 150 surface

combatants to meet future requirements for forward presence and to provide additional surge capability in a crisis. During the next several years, we will reduce our forces to these levels.

The growing threat posed by the spread of high-technology weaponry means that we must rely even more heavily on our technological advantages. Today, our operational commanders have an extensive menu of both complex and traditional weapons from which to draw. As the overall number of Navy ships declines, we intend to offset some of the limitations of a smaller force structure by advances in weapons technology which will enable us to use an increased number of platforms as instruments of long range striking power. This distribution of firepower is best illustrated by the Navy's introduction of cruise missiles, which can be launched from a number of air, surface and subsurface platforms.

Naval forces also have the capability to influence events ashore by employing the flexible assault capabilities of our amphibious forces, which are built around Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). Each MAGTF, regardless of its size, is a task organized, self-sustaining, fully combat-capable unit which may be deployed in amphibious ships or airlifted to rendezvous with prepositioned equipment, supplies, and ammunition.

In recent years, we have focused considerable effort on mine countermeasures. Our helicopter and surface mine

countermeasures (MCM) forces have made great strides, but new mine technology is proliferating rapidly. We cannot ignore the potential threat a dedicated mining effort would pose to our operating forces and our critical sea lanes. A force of 14 modern surface mine countermeasures ships and planned mine hunting ships will be a vital part of America's balanced naval force for the next decade.

Sealift and afloat prepositioning of heavy combat equipment and supplies are absolutely vital for sustained power projection operations. Responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait presented a particularly demanding challenge due to the lack of strategic warning, the immense distances involved, and the sheer size of the U.S. forces and material which had to be moved. Nonetheless, during the first six months of Operations *DESERT SHIELD* and *DESERT STORM*, U.S. strategic sealift, augmented by chartered commercial ships, moved over 2.1 million tons of combat equipment and supplies.

There is no single solution to the requirement for strategic lift. Airlift, prepositioning, rapid response sealift, reserve augmentation shipping, and the availability of ports and air-



fields at debarkation points are all elements of the entire picture. A Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study of airlift, sealift, prepositioning and amphibious lift requirements is presently under way. In coordination with this effort, the Navy is developing options for additional roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) capability and is also developing plans to acquire new construction and/or commercially available ships, pending the study's results.

In addition to highly-capable active forces, we will also need trained and qualified reserve forces to buttress active units in times of war or national emergency. Today, the value of a ready reserve component is being demonstrated dramatically in Operation *DESERT STORM*. Navy Reserve personnel have responded superbly, and are integrated fully to support our forces in Southwest Asia.

### More Than Numbers

The smaller Navy described above reflects a 25 percent decrease from the 600-ship Navy that was identified during the 1980s as the minimum force needed to counter a growing Soviet capability. It also represents an 18 percent decrease in the size of the current U.S. Navy. The current evaluation of a diminished Soviet threat permits meeting America's requirement for maritime superiority with smaller naval forces.

This is not, however, a risk-free strategy. There should be no doubt that, if the continued decline in Navy funding, force structure, modernization and personnel persists, we will reach a point where this nation will no longer be capable of maintaining the maritime superiority so vital to the support of our global interests. In pursuing this path, we must evaluate carefully America's requirements for national defense and, in particular, for naval forces. From today's perspective, I must conclude that we should not drop below the 450 ship level we will reach in 1995. To do so would seriously jeopardize our ability to maintain maritime superiority.

With a smaller Navy force structure, we will find it increasingly difficult to maintain the wide balance of capabilities required to counter sudden, unexpected geopolitical challenges and newly emerging threats. Moreover, these forces will be unable to support a regional crisis or conflict for more than a few months without major departure from preferred rotation and deployment policies.

Our people remain the strong foundation upon which our maritime strength is built. We must continue to attract and retain the best of our nation's youth. To do that we have to operate our force in a way that provides our sailors and Marines a decent, realistic quality of life -- beginning with stable sea-and shore-rotation patterns. Current guidelines

concerning the time sailors are away from home port must be followed, with only temporary disruptions for crises or national emergency, even while force structure shrinks.

There are, however, other issues that are just as important to our sailors. As we reduce the size of our active forces, we must be careful not to draw down our personnel too quickly. Large involuntary releases hurt morale and will make it more difficult to recruit high-quality personnel. Our people must receive sufficient basic and advanced training in a realistic environment to inspire confidence in both themselves and their shipmates. While serving their country, they deserve ships, submarines, and aircraft which are well-maintained and combat ready -- with sufficient time and funds being allocated for periodic overhaul and maintenance.

### Constancy and Change

The prospect of a global war between NATO and the

Warsaw Pact has diminished, and the world is undergoing a period of rapid change. Although we do not yet know where these changes will lead, we are unlikely to see a return to the fear of immediate military confrontation between the two superpowers. This is not, however, an invitation to return to isolationism. America's enduring worldwide interests require that we remain involved in the international arena. Our task is to maintain the constancy of purpose that brought about a favorable resolution of the cold war while shifting our focus and attention to a more diverse set of challenges.

In the years ahead, our nation's leaders will still find naval forces just as useful, just as necessary, and just as important as they have been so often during the years of the cold war. In peacetime, crisis, or conflict, naval forces will continue to serve our nation and our national leadership. Our ability to refocus our efforts upon the changing requirements of the next decade will determine how well we meet the challenges before us.





# Appendix

## Building the Future Force

### The Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Navy Budget

The U.S. Navy of the 1990s will be a force evolving along with U.S. national security strategy. It will have the capability to counter regional threats to U.S. interests and the ability to reconstitute in the event of global war. This force will necessarily grow smaller, responding to national priorities in a changing international environment. The Navy budget for 1992 reflects the prudent adjustment of naval forces necessary to maximize the investment already made, while accounting for the changes taking place in the world and our nation's financial realities.

#### A Force for the Future

We will reduce the size of the Navy to a balanced Fleet of about 450 ships by 1995. It is a highly-capable force considering the world environment, our federal budget goals, and the maritime nature of our nation. The following table contrasting fiscal year 1987 Navy force levels with those planned for fiscal year 1992 illustrates the significant drawdown in naval forces over a five-year period.

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1992</u>
Strategic Forces		
SSBN	37	29
Combatant Forces		
Aircraft Carriers*	13	12
Attack Submarines	102	88
Amphibious Ships	64	62
Surface Combatants	222	151
Patrol Combatants	6	6
Mine Countermeasures	4	13
Combat Logistics	56	53
Support Forces		
Support Ships	<u>55</u>	<u>62</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>559</b>	<b>476</b>

\* This figure does not include carriers undergoing SLEP or nuclear recoring.

It should be noted that Operation *DESERT STORM* will necessarily affect the timing of our ship inactivations. For example, current plans to retire both remaining battleships and the aircraft carrier USS *MIDWAY* (CV 41) by the end of fiscal year 1991, as well as to convert USS *FORRESTAL* (CV 59) to a training carrier (AVT) in the same period have been put on hold. Once hostilities in the Persian Gulf theater

cease, we will move to complete these actions as soon as possible.

The requirements for a balanced Navy are derived from a number of calculations but, in the final analysis, they are predicated on the assumption that the United States will maintain the capability to protect its interests abroad. In peacetime, we have routinely deployed up to 30 percent of our available forces. That level of deployment provides a naval presence in areas of potential conflict, as well as an ability to surge forces from the U.S. for crises or regional conflict. It also enables us to maintain our weapon systems, ships, and aircraft and to train our people. It also provides a reasonable balance of time at sea and in port for our sailors.

#### Deployment Considerations

If we wish to increase our presence in a region, the percentage of the force deployed can be increased or forces can be drawn from other areas. However, as the percentage of the Fleet which is deployed increases, we reduce our flexibility to surge forces and begin to constrain the time available for necessary maintenance. The impact of increasing deployment percentages for a typical ship over a 36-month period can be seen below:

<u>Percent Deployed</u>	<u>Months Deployed</u>	<u>Months Underway</u>	<u>Months Out of Home</u>
30 %	11	15	17
35 %	12.5	16	18
40 %	14.5	17	19.5
45 %	16	18	20.5

Note that time spent underway or away from homeport does not equate to time on station in the region of potential crisis. Transit time takes up 30 to 35 percent of the time for a ship deploying to the Indian Ocean, approximately 15 percent of a deployment to the Mediterranean, and about 17 percent of a deployment to the Western Pacific. For planning purposes, we use 25 percent as a historical guide for transit time computations.

Additionally, there is a periodic need to modernize and repair weapons systems and platforms. On average, 15 percent

of the force is undergoing major maintenance and modernization at any given time. Based on the percentage of naval forces deployed and the transit time from their homeports, it is possible to determine the overall deployment and response capability of a given naval force.

## Force Calculations

With a force of 12 aircraft carriers, the deployment of about 30 percent of the available force -- a peacetime tempo of operations -- sustains between two and three carriers forward deployed for presence and immediate crisis response. Increasing the percent of the force forward deployed to 40 percent sustains about three carriers on station full time. Increasing to 45 percent would enable us to dedicate three carriers continuously to a regional conflict and surge an additional carrier to another theater if required.

## Promoting Regional Stability

In addition to the carriers described above, deploying approximately 30 percent of a force of 450 ships can support deployment of 14 SSNs, between two and three Amphibious Ready Groups and 25 to 30 other surface combatants. These ships can be configured into a wide range of task forces tail-


ored to specific circumstances which can be dispersed within a theater of operations as desired.

For our national decision makers, this force level means that an Amphibious Strike Task Force [one Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and one Amphibious Ready Group/ Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU)] could arrive at an area of crisis anywhere in the world in less than seven days -- with a second carrier arriving in less than 15 days and a full Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) on station in less than 30 days. The importance of this capability was highlighted by the initial naval response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, where naval forces were one of the major deterrents to an invasion of Saudi Arabia.

## Responding to Regional Conflicts

Should hostilities which involve U.S. forces break out or should we wish to bring greater power to bear on a potential adversary, we could increase the number of deploying forces to 40 percent of our total inventory. At this level of effort, we could have three carriers on station in less than 25 days. In less than 30 days, we could also deploy an entire Marine Expeditionary Force into theater using a combination of amphibious ships, airlift, and maritime prepositioning ships.





However, making a carrier available for a simultaneous crisis in another theater would probably require deploying greater than 40 percent of the force. It should be noted that, as the size of the Navy decreases, we will not be able to forward deploy as many forces as we do today without having an immediate adverse effect on maintenance and training and, over time, on the retention of our sailors.

### **Hedging Against Global Conflict**

We currently estimate that we would have significant strategic warning of a global conflict which would allow sufficient time to reactivate decommissioned vessels and complete the construction of new ships on the building ways. The Innovative Naval Reserve Concept (INRC) is an example of the flexibility which this increased warning time allows. This new initiative for the 40-ship FF-1052 *KNOX* class of ASW frigates redesignates eight ships as FFT training platforms while placing the remaining 32 in a 180-day Reduced Operational Status (ROS). All of these ships, manned by reservists, could be brought back into service and trained for Fleet ASW missions in the event of a major war. The purpose of this program is to protect our investment in these very capital-intensive resources, and allow reconstitution of forces which would otherwise take years to build. In addition, it will also increase the level of readiness and training for the Selected Reserve crews of these ships.

### **Modernizing the Force for the Future**

We have already begun building toward a balanced force

which can meet all of these contingencies. It will be smaller, but we cannot afford for it to be less capable. Older ships and aircraft are being retired at the end of their service lives -- some even sooner in cases where the cost of their maintenance and upkeep is disproportionate to their utility. These platforms will be replaced by fewer but more capable ships and aircraft. Many of our ongoing programs represent incremental improvements over existing, proven platforms and weapons systems. Some, however, represent significant technological advancements and will define the force of the future.

### **Carrier Force Levels**

We expect to reach a force of 12 deployable aircraft carriers in October 1991 with the scheduled retirement of USS *MIDWAY* (CV 41), which will be relieved in Japan by USS *INDEPENDENCE* (CV 62). In addition, USS *CONSTELLATION* (CV 64) will be in Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and USS *ENTERPRISE* (CVN 65) will be undergoing a nuclear recoring overhaul. USS *LEXINGTON* (AVT 16), after a long and illustrious career, will be replaced as the Navy's training carrier (AVT) by USS *FORRESTAL* (CV 59). As stated earlier, Operation *DESERT STORM* may impact the timing of these scheduled transfers.

### **Carrier Air Wing of the Future**

The carrier battle group and its airwing will remain the primary force for power projection and the centerpiece of a balanced Fleet. Maintaining its technological edge is of paramount concern. The current carrier air wing is a highly capable multipurpose force as proven in Operation *DESERT*

**STORM.** The carrier aircraft of today will continue to be deployed through this decade and into the 21st century. However, we must begin now to design replacements in order to avoid block obsolescence as today's aircraft reach the end of their service lives.

**Attack Aircraft.** The cancellation of the A-12 will require us to maintain the aging A-6 for a longer period than the Navy had previously planned. This will be accomplished by modernizing and re-winging the A-6 under the SWIP-1A program. We are currently working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to structure a program to provide naval aviation with the modern air wings which will be required in the 21st century. We envision that these air wings will consist of a new all-weather attack aircraft with stealth capabilities, together with an improved version of the F/A-18 which will have increased range, survivability, payload, and under-the-weather targeting capability. As soon as these programs are approved, we expect an amendment to the current budget to be submitted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

**Air Superiority.** Air supremacy was gained early in Operation *DESERT STORM* due primarily to the superior training and readiness of our air crews and the technological superiority of U.S. aircraft. The Navy's primary air superiority fighter remains the F-14 *TOMCAT*, which will be replaced by an improved version of the F/A-18 when the F-14 phases out in the next century. The development and procurement of a new generation fighter aircraft will be pursued after procurement of the A-6 replacement. It does not appear affordable to procure both a new fighter and attack aircraft at the same time. We will continue to buy the F/A-18 at the maximum rate affordable in order to provide sufficient aircraft to fill carrier decks in the future as older aircraft leave the inventory.

**Electronic Warfare Aircraft.** Current EA-6B aircraft will be remanufactured to extend their service life. We are also proceeding with a modernization program to upgrade this aircraft's electronic warfare and strike support capabilities.

**Airborne Early Warning.** The E-2C *HAWKEYE* aircraft added to the airwing over the next few years will be configured with the APS-145 radar and will significantly improve the early warning and command and control capabilities of the battle group. Again, we are carefully investigating follow-on options for the capabilities provided by the E-2C and EA-6B.

#### **Maritime Patrol and ASW Aircraft**

In the absence of a follow-on, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, we are faced with the need to move quickly to improve our existing MPA force. Our present P-3 force provides the multifaceted, long-endurance surface surveillance

capability, that is necessary in maritime blockade and regional conflict scenarios such as Operations *DESERT SHIELD* and *DESERT STORM*. It also provides a long range counter to enemy surface ships and an ASW hedge against the existing Soviet and Third World submarine capability.

The SH-60B (LAMPS MK III) and the SH-60F helicopters provide improved organic ASW and anti-surface capabilities to our surface combatants and battle groups. Procurement of nine HH-60H helicopters in fiscal year 1992 and seven in fiscal year 1993 addresses a long-standing need for a survivable organic SAR capability for the battle group.

#### **Jet Trainer Program**

We are continuing to modernize our fleet of training aircraft with the purchase of the T-45 fixed-wing jet trainer. As the TA-4 jet trainer currently in use reaches the end of its service life, the T-45, along with its associated simulator and maintenance packages, will provide our carrier-based naval aviators with the finest training available. We plan to procure 12 of these aircraft in both fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993, 36 aircraft in fiscal year 1994 and 48 aircraft per year from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 1997.



## Aircraft Procurement Plan

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>FY91</u>	<u>FY92</u>	<u>FY93</u>
EA-6B <i>PROWLER</i> (Electronic Warfare)	1	-	3
AV-8B <i>HARRIER</i> (Attack)	24	-	-
F/A-18 <i>HORNET</i> (Strike/Fighter)	48	36	20*
CH/MH-53 <i>SEA STALLION</i> (Helo)	-	20	20
AH-1W <i>SUPERCOBRA</i> (Attack Helo)	-	12	12
HH-60B <i>SEAHAWK</i> (Combat Rescue)	-	9	7
SH-60B <i>SEAHAWK</i> (Escort-Based ASW Helo)	6	12	12
SH-60F <i>SEAHAWK</i> (CV-Based ASW Helo)	18	12	12
E-2C <i>HAWKEYE</i> (Surveillance)	6	6	6
T-45 <i>GOSHAWK</i> (Trainer)	-	12	12
<b>TOTAL AIRCRAFT</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>104</b>

\* Final number is pending a decision by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and will be included in the amended budget submission.

### Submarine Fleet of the Future

**TRIDENT.** The final *TRIDENT* ballistic-missile submarine was funded in fiscal year 1991, completing the most modern, survivable, and flexible leg of our nation's strategic triad. With the *TRIDENT II* (D-5) missile now at sea, we also have a weapon which can be employed with pin-point accuracy against even the most hardened target. Although we will not back-fit the D-5 missile into early *OHIO*-class SSBNs, our strategic nuclear deterrent force remains strong and reliable and will serve us well into the next century.

**SSN-21.** Our attack submarine force consists of *LOS ANGELES*-class SSNs and the remaining *STURGEON*-class SSNs which were built during the 1960s. These submarines have performed magnificently and are highly capable, but they contain little room for today's more modern systems. We plan to build at least one *SEAWOLF*-class SSN per year to replace these ships as they reach the end of their safe service lives and to keep pace with improvements in the Soviet submarine fleet. Additionally, we are commencing a study effort to define new, lower-cost options for a successor to the *SEAWOLF*.

While affordability will be a major consideration, this follow-on SSN must be capable of maintaining our edge in ASW against projected 21st century threats.

### Surface Fleet of the Future

The United States will rely increasingly on flexible and mobile surface forces to protect our national interests and ensure global stability in the future international environment. The future surface fleet will consist of technologically sophisticated ships capable of operating across the full spectrum of independent and battle force missions. These surface forces will ensure our continued access to critical sea areas, will be capable of projecting power ashore, and will be able to defend themselves against technologically advanced threats.

Our shipbuilding program has decreased significantly from earlier years. We are now building an average of five combatants and four amphibious/support ships per year, compared to the average of nine combatants and eight amphibious/support ships built per year in the 1980s. Despite these lower numbers, we are building toward a force composed of indi-

vidually more capable ships. From the outset, however, it is essential that we understand that this eight ship/year building rate, coupled with a notional 35-year service life, could reduce us to a Navy 50 percent of the current size within a few decades. Careful management of current assets and future investments will be needed to assure maintenance of sufficient force levels to meet national requirements. Current procurement plans provide for continued -- though much slower -- modernization in ASW, general purpose, amphibious, and minesweeping forces, as well as oceanographic research-ships.


**DDG-51.** The *ARLEIGH BURKE* (DDG-51)-class is the Navy's second class of *AEGIS* surface combatant. It contains significant technological advances over previous destroyers, which will enable it to deal with more advanced threats. Although budgetary constraints have caused us to reduce the projected construction rate from previous years, the current plan continues the procurement of the DDG-51 Flight II as the primary replacement for the DDG-2 and DDG-37 classes. This is a reduction in modernization plans from those agreed to in the Major Warship Review, which had programmed a follow-on DDG-51 Flight III with an integrated ASW helo capability.

**Combat Logistics.** The new AOE-6-class fast combat support ship significantly enhances our ability to sustain deployed carrier battle groups. Although the reduced AOE-6

shipbuilding plan will not allow us to achieve the original goal of one AOE per battle group, we plan to satisfy CVBG deployment needs in the near term by substituting the combination of an AE and an AOR/AO/TAO for the AOE. To help meet future requirements, we will continue to "jumbo-ize" the AO-177 *CIMARRON*-class oilers, adding a significantly upgraded refueling capability as well as the ability to carry a limited amount of ammunition.

**Amphibious Lift.** Our amphibious lift proved itself capable and ready in the deployment to the Persian Gulf of the largest amphibious task force since the Inchon landing during the Korean War. As a part of overall force reductions, amphibious forces capability will be gradually reduced to support 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades. In fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993, we will see the final two hulls of the LSD-49 (cargo variant). Fiscal year 1992 also contains the last 12 LCAC's needed to fulfill our requirement for high-speed over-the-horizon amphibious assault. Additionally, planning is on track for fiscal year 1995 procurement of the first LX, a follow-on ship scheduled to replace the LPD class which is nearing the end of its effective service life. A final major planning change in the area of amphibious lift is our decision to halt the LHD program with the construction of LHD-5 in fiscal year 1991.

**Mine Warfare.** The MCM-1 *AVENGER* is the first of a new generation of Mine Countermeasures ships designed to replace



### Ship Construction Program

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>FY91</u>	<u>FY92</u>	<u>FY93</u>
SSBN-726 <i>OHIO</i> -class ( <i>TRIDENT</i> Ballistic-Missile Submarine)	1	-	-
SSN-21 <i>SEAWOLF</i> -class (Attack Submarine)	1	1	1
DDG-51 <i>ARLEIGH BURKE</i> -class ( <i>AEGIS</i> Destroyer)	4	5	4
LHD-1 <i>WASP</i> -class (Amphibious Assault ship)	1	-	-
LSD-41 (CV) <i>WHIDBEY ISLAND</i> -class (Cargo Variant Dock Landing Ship)	1	1	1
MHC-51 <i>OSPREY</i> -class (Coastal Minhunter)	2	2	2
TAGOS 23-class (Ocean Surveillance Ship)	-	-	1
AOE 6 <i>SUPPLY</i> -class (Fast Combat Support Ship)	-	1	-
TAGS/AGOR (Oceanographic Research Ships)	-	2	2
Sealift	-	*TBD	*TBD
LCAC (Landing Craft Air Cushion)	(12)	(12)	-
<b>Total Ships</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>

\* Dependent upon results of the Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS)

the aging MSO-class ships. The *AVENGER* class embodies significant technological advances in mine hunting and mine neutralization. In addition to completing construction of the *AVENGER* class, we are building the MHC-51 *OSPREY*-class coastal minehunter. We are planning a surface MCM program of 14 MCM-1s, 12 MHCs and eight MHC(V)s, which are deployable versions of the MHC.

It is more important than ever to maintain the forward momentum of our shipbuilding program. The industrial base and secondary vendor base of this vital industry are shrinking dramatically. The Navy now provides over 96 percent of the income of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. We have entered an era where we may no longer have the industrial capacity to

rebuild a Fleet in time of crisis. We must maintain sufficient construction to provide a capable Fleet over the long term.

#### Strategic Sealift

The prudent investment of over \$7 billion in strategic sealift modernization during the 1980s played a vital role in the rapid and timely response of sealift to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. *DESERT SHIELD* and *DESERT STORM* typify the kind of rapidly evolving regional crisis response we can expect in the post-cold war environment and highlight the need to review our strategic lift capabilities and take appropriate action in support of national sealift policy. Our budget contains \$1.2 billion over the fiscal year 1992-97 period for procurement of sealift ships. The exact ship numbers and types

will be determined by the Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS). We are examining options to build or buy additional roll-on/roll-off ships for the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) if the CMMS should so recommend.

### Space and Electronic Warfare

Recognizing the need for a coherent approach to the integration, management, and tactical employment of our surveillance, targeting, communications, and electronic warfare systems, we have established Space and Electronic Warfare (SEW) as a primary warfare mission area. SEW incorporates space assets, command, control, communications (C3), C3 countermeasures (C3CM), and electronic warfare to maximize our technological superiority and to improve our ability to operate and fight together with allied and joint forces. It also encompasses information warfare and seeks to assure communications between tactical, space, surveillance, and strategic warfighting systems.

As high-technology weaponry and sensors become more available to Third World nations, they will gradually improve their ability to integrate and tactically employ these advanced systems. The integration of SEW into force-wide designs and tactics seeks to safeguard our offensive and defensive abilities against a widening range of threats.

### Oceanography

We continue to modernize our oceanographic data collection, assimilation and dissemination systems to keep pace with the demands of our Navy's new technology. We will maintain a vigorous, deep-ocean survey program since bathymetric and gravimetric data are essential to the operations of our tactical and strategic weapons systems. One of our coastal survey ships is presently employed in inshore survey operations for Operation *DESERT STORM*. More efficient technology is also being incorporated into the new Coastal Hydrographic Survey Ships, USNS *MCDONNELL* and USNS *LITTLE-HALES* which are being purchased in fiscal year 1992-93.

### Navy Manpower

There is no investment of defense dollars from which more gain is realized in the near term or over time than our investment in people. Hardware and platforms depreciate with age, becoming increasingly expendable with obsolescence. Our people, on the other hand, gain increasing value throughout their careers. At no time in recent history has the investment of our nation in Navy men and women been so vividly displayed to the world as in the execution of Operations *DESERT SHIELD* and *DESERT STORM*.

In times of force reductions it is crucial that we keep the well-being of our men and women in sharp focus. As we

draw down our personnel levels to 510,000 by the end of fiscal year 1995, we must minimize the number of professional service members who are involuntarily separated. At the same time, we must maintain a suitable quality of life for those people who continue to serve their country. If we exclude personnel in transit or training, then 70 percent of our enlisted force is either at sea or assigned to overseas shore duty. Accordingly, it is essential that we apply future budgetary reductions carefully in order not to decimate the number of CONUS shore billets available for our sailors.

### Quality of Life

We are continuing to pursue those personnel programs and initiatives that have paid off so handsomely in the past, including more and improved family housing, child care centers, medical care, and base maintenance and support. To keep our ships and aircraft squadrons fully manned we must provide a working environment that is as safe and comfortable as possible and ensure that the families of our sailors are taken care of during their absence at sea. Additionally, we must also attend to the spiritual well-being of our forces through a variety of religious, counseling, and support programs.

A fair compensation package is essential to supporting our sailors and their families, and is an important tool in attracting and retaining the kind of high-quality people that we need. Unfortunately, military pay raises have lagged significantly behind private sector wage growth during the last decade. As we move toward a smaller force, it is important that we send the right signal of support to our men and women in uniform. I strongly support the 4.1 percent pay raise requested in the budget.





We also continue to strive for a better sea/shore rotation schedule which provides an opportunity for our people to expand their professional horizons. Throughout this period of dynamic change in the Navy, the cornerstone of our personnel programs remains our unrelenting commitment to professionalism -- a commitment that has paid off handsomely in the performance of our forces in the Middle East.

### **Operations *DESERT SHIELD* and *DESERT STORM***

The realities of Operations *DESERT SHIELD* and *DESERT STORM* require extended family separations for our service-members. As a result of a concerted effort over the last decade, our system of family support on the home front has dramatically increased. This system is composed of a variety of organizations including family services centers, Dependents' Assistance Boards, ombudsmen organizations, chaplains, wives clubs, and command support groups. We are making every effort to provide a support system that is responsive to the needs of our families during this period of increased stress.

### **Officer Accessions**

As force reductions are initiated, accession levels will be decreased proportionately. The Navy will meet Department of Defense guidance to reduce the size of the service academies, and the size of the Naval Academy brigade will decrease from the currently authorized total of 4,525 midshipmen to less than

4,000 by 1995. We will also meet Congressional requirement to reduce the class entry size of the entering class to 1,132 by July 1991.

NROTC accessions will also be reduced over the next several years, with accessions declining from the current level of 1,600 to 1,100 in fiscal year 1995. Failure to adjust the NROTC program overhead would have resulted in smaller, less viable units and an unacceptable increase in the cost per NROTC commission. Consequently, the number of NROTC units will be reduced from 66 to 53, a reduction that keeps the Navy's ROTC production in balance with accession goals and scholarships.

### **Selective Early Retirement**

Faced with the requirement to reduce our officer strength rapidly while preserving reasonable career opportunities for our junior officers, we have very reluctantly formed Selective Early Retirement (SER) boards to identify captains and commanders for early retirement. Using the procedures specified in DOPMA, the first in a planned series of these boards convened in December 1990 and selected 442 officers to retire no later than Aug. 1, 1991. Though a painful process, it is much preferred to forcing mid-career officers out of service.

### **Recruiting**

A key element of Navy manpower strategy has always been to recruit and retain those young men and women who are intellectually, morally and physically most capable of doing the job. It is essential that the caliber of the young people we recruit into the Navy be progressively improved as we drive toward a smaller and more technologically-advanced force. Our goals are high -- we seek at least 95 percent high school graduates, 60 percent of all recruits from upper mental groups, and zero mental group IV recruits. The payoff of our past investments in quality is apparent in the Fleet today. We are experiencing lower remediation rates in boot camp, less attrition from technical training, higher advancement rates, and lower desertion rates, all as a result of our commitment to quality. This enduring commitment to attract and retain the highest quality personnel will enhance our readiness to meet any future threat.

### **Naval Reserve Force**

#### **Recall**

The performance of our reserve personnel in Operation *DESERT STORM* validates the Naval Reserve as a critical link in our Navy's crisis response effort. When called, naval reservists have reported for duty trained and ready -- filling virtually all requirements for reserve augmentation.

The number of reservists recalled has grown rapidly dur-



ing recent weeks, with significant numbers of those individuals scheduled to deploy to the Persian Gulf region. With the current CNO recall authorization standing at over 32,700, we have actually recalled, as of Feb. 7, 1991, over 18,300 Navy Selected Reservists. Over half of those recalled have been Naval Reserve medical personnel. Many provided the "back-fill" needed to sustain patient care capability at CONUS medical treatment facilities. Others were called up with the activation of two Naval Reserve fleet hospitals, while still others have augmented the hospital ships *MERCY* and *COMFORT*, enabling them to double their patient care capability to 1,000 beds each. The balance of the recall has involved the full spectrum of reserve units, including: mobile inshore undersea warfare, mine warfare, Military Sealift Command, naval control of shipping, intelligence, SEALs, chaplains, public affairs, strike rescue, cargo handling, SEABEES and ship augmentation. Additionally, four reserve transport squadrons have been recalled to support airlift of personnel and cargo in the operational theater.

#### Naval Reserve Reductions

The ongoing reduction in active force structure will cause a corresponding reduction in Naval Reserve manpower levels. Selected Reserve numbers, which include both SELRES and TAR manning levels, will see a reduction from fiscal year 1991 force levels of about 12 percent, to a total of approximately 134,600 in fiscal year 1992. These reductions are


driven by a combination of changing requirements and reduced active force structure.

#### NRF Surface Forces

The increased warning time provided by a reduced Soviet threat enables us to expand the use of Naval Reserves through the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept (INRC) which was described earlier. The INRC will achieve a significant savings compared to current FF-1052 costs. This program preserves force structure and allows reconstitution to full capability in a mobilization scenario. Additionally, NRF mine warfare forces are being significantly modernized by the addition of new MHCs.

#### Naval Reserve Aviation

Our two reserve carrier air wings remain ready and highly-capable forces. Today's less immediate Soviet submarine threat has enabled the size of the Maritime Patrol Aircraft to be changed from 24 active/13 reserve squadrons to 18 active/9 reserve squadrons. In addition, squadron aircraft allowances have been reduced to eight aircraft for each active and reserve squadron rather than the previous nine aircraft. We no longer maintain the Squadron Air Augmentation Unit program, which augmented active fleet squadrons with reserve personnel. Other reductions include the deletion of the two Reserve Aerial Mine-Countermeasure (HM) squadrons and one of the three Reserve *LAMPS MK I* squadrons.



## Medical Care

In planning for the future, we have made a commitment to ensure the continuing well-being of Navy medicine, realizing full well that it directly affects not only our active-duty forces and their medical readiness, but also the entire community of retirees and families of active-duty personnel. As manpower and force structure have been reduced in the current budget, we made a deliberate decision to protect funding for Navy medical personnel and programs, in order to maintain and improve medical care for our people and their families. This is a critical readiness and quality-of-life issue that must remain in the forefront of future planning, as it is inextricably linked to our ability to quickly respond to contingencies such as Operations *DESERT SHIELD* and *DESERT STORM*, our retention goals, and overall Fleet readiness.

Our funding plans for the future focus on several key areas of health care and aim to carefully balance direct care, CHAMPUS, managed care, and coordinated health care alternatives. We will continue to invest in the efficiencies and benefits resulting from the Medical Blue Ribbon Panel initiatives. We have increased CHAMPUS funding levels in both fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1993 (although costs will continue to rise) while incorporating projected savings from contracting, partnership agreements and the CHAMPUS Reform Initiative. We continue to explore innovative ways to use the flexibility granted by Congress to implement effective strategies for ensuring access to health care services while minimizing the use of CHAMPUS.

## Environment

### Environmental Awareness

As we witness a marked upsurge in environmental awareness in society as a whole, we in the Navy are committed to protecting our fragile environment, particularly in the delicate coastal and intertidal zones. Although naval forces usually operate in the open oceans, our bases, maintenance facilities, and near-shore operating areas give us a very large and prominent presence in the coastal zones of the United States and throughout the world. Accordingly, we are continuing with a variety of programs that not only foster a heightened awareness of environmental concerns within our forces but creates a sense of environmental stewardship which pervades the entire chain of command. Some of our ongoing programs that have had significant positive impact in our day-to-day operations, both afloat and ashore, include: intensive management of hazardous material, minimization of hazardous waste, restoration of existing hazardous waste disposal sites, reduction of plastics disposal at sea, conservation and eventual elimination of ozone depleting substances, and strict adherence to laws governing the discharge of oily wastes and

atmospheric pollutants. The Navy is committed to a strong and active participation in environmental compliance.

## Base Closures and Reductions

As the size of the Navy is reduced, it is essential that we have a corresponding decrease in the size of our supporting infrastructure. A separate list of recommended shore infrastructure adjustments will be submitted by the Secretary of Defense. This list will contain base closure recommendations and realignments driven by changes in the force structure. The configuration of our future infrastructure will be significantly less than it is today, and will be designed to enable us to efficiently perform our mission. Until we obtain final approval to reconfigure our shore infrastructure, we intend to adequately fund the operations and maintenance of our bases in fiscal year 1992.

## Pillars

The fiscal year 1992-93 budget has been built upon a comprehensive framework supported by the four principal budget pillars, shown here accompanied by their percent share of the budget.

<u>President's Budget</u>		
	<u>FY91</u>	<u>FY92</u>
● Force Structure	22 %	15 %
● Readiness	54 %	61 %
● Sustainability	8 %	7 %
● Modernization	16 %	17 %

As a result of the continuing decline in fiscal resources in consonance with a smaller force structure, the fiscal year 1992 budget reflects a decrease in funding for both Force Structure and Sustainability. Modernization and Readiness show proportionate increases, which is consistent with our goal of keeping forces capable even while we necessarily reduce our numbers. A brief review of the primary elements contained within each of the four pillars follows.

### Force Structure

The Force Structure pillar includes ship procurement, aircraft procurement and new mission military construction. For fiscal year 1992-93, force structure experienced a decrease in funding of \$19 billion from the fiscal year 1991 President's budget, a 7 percent drop in share of Navy TOA. The aviation program reflects the immediate loss of the P-7, A-12 and F-14 remanufacture programs. While we can survive a short-term reduction in aviation funding, sufficient funding over the long haul is a critical factor in ensuring the

viability of a carrier-based tactical air capability into the next century. Fiscal year 1992 capital investment in shipbuilding is considerably less robust than in previous years, reflecting current lower budget levels.

### Readiness

The Readiness pillar supports the daily operations of our active forces, and includes: fuel and spares; military and civilian pay; ordnance consumption; depot maintenance of ships, aircraft, and ordnance; training; and medical services. Although this pillar decreases by \$4.7 billion in fiscal year 1992-93 from the fiscal year 1991 President's Budget, its overall share of Navy TOA increases by 7 percent. This increase is consistent with our goal of adequately funding and training our forces to prevent a "hollow" force structure. These readiness levels are absolutely critical in view of the forward deployed and expeditionary character of the majority of our naval forces. The response of naval forces to *DESERT SHIELD* and *DESERT STORM* clearly reflects the continued high premium that we place on readiness. However, because of the requirement to deploy ships quickly to the Persian Gulf, some sailed before the completion of scheduled maintenance and extended maintenance on others was deferred. This backlog will need to be completed after the conclusion of Operation *DESERT STORM*.

### Sustainability

The Sustainability pillar supports the Navy's ability to sustain wartime operations and focuses primarily on ordnance procurement and the Naval Reserve Force. This area has experienced a \$5 billion decrease in fiscal year 1992-93 from the fiscal year 1991 President's Budget and a 1 percent decrease in share of Navy TOA. Even though ordnance investment is decreasing, current procurement will provide inventories which are sufficient to support projected future maritime contingencies. Procurement of ordnance designed to counter

the Soviet threat has been restructured and procurement strategies refocused to sustain the requirements of regional conflict scenarios. In the case of those weapons which have projected inventories not yet sufficient to completely support regional conflicts, the planned procurement will either result in increased sustainability or, by keeping a warm production line open, ensure that weapon production can be ramped up to meet future uncertainties. As Operation *DESERT STORM* unfolds, the sustainability budget contains the most uncertainty and potential for growth. To maintain our existing warfighting advantages, the large expenditures of land attack ordnance, including TLAM, HARM and precision standoff weapons will, as a minimum, have to be replaced.

### Modernization

The Modernization pillar contains improvements in the military capability and effectiveness of our existing forces, including aircraft modifications, ship modifications, ordnance modifications, and research and development. As with the other pillars, Modernization has been decreased by \$3.8 billion in fiscal year 1992-93 from the fiscal year 1991 President's Budget. Even though modernization increased by 1 percent as a percentage of Navy TOA, the substantial cuts in our investment in modernization for surface ships, submarines, and aircraft will cut into programs aimed at augmenting the major warfighting capabilities of these platforms.

## A Balanced and Flexible Force

The smaller U.S. Navy described in the fiscal year 1992-93 budget provides an appropriate sea-based strategic deterrent against any current or potential nuclear threat to our country, as well as a realistic hedge against a global threat to our national interests. It also provides:

- the capability to maintain tailored naval task groups on station for stability operations and ready crisis response in several theaters of strategic importance,
- the capability to respond promptly with appropriate forces to emerging crises,
- the capability to surge forces as the forward/enabling elements of a joint task force for a regional conflict,
- the capability to sustain appropriate naval forces in a regional conflict while continuing limited stability operations elsewhere -- but only through major departure from preferred deployment/rotation policies,
- a base for mobilization and reconstitution of naval forces in the event of a change in the geostrategic climate and a march toward global conflict.





**General A. M. Gray**  
**Commandant**  
**United States Marine Corps**

Born in Rahway, N.J., General Gray enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1950. He served overseas with Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, attaining the rank of sergeant before being commissioned a second lieutenant in April 1952. Early tours included service with the 11th and 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division in Korea, the 8th Marines, 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, N.C., and Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., during which he saw service in Guantanamo Bay and Vietnam.

As a major, General Gray joined the 12th Marines, 3rd Marine Division, Vietnam, in October 1965, serving concurrently as regimental communications officer, regimental training officer and artillery aerial observer. He took command of the Composite Artillery Battalion and U.S. Free World Forces at Gio Linh in April 1967. In September 1967, General Gray was reassigned to the III Marine Amphibious Force in Da Nang where he commanded the 1st Radio Battalion elements throughout I Corps until February 1968. Following a brief tour in the United States, he returned to Vietnam from June to September 1969 in conjunction with surveillance and reconnaissance matters in the I Corps area.



After his Vietnam tour, General Gray served as Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines; Battalion Landing Team 1/2; the 2nd Marines; the 4th Marines; and Camp Commander of Camp Hansen, Okinawa, Japan. While commanding the 33rd Marine Amphibious Unit and Regimental Landing Team-4, and concurrently serving as Deputy Commander, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, General Gray directed the Southeast Asia evacuation operations in 1975.

Advanced to brigadier general in March 1976, General Gray served as Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic, and the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade. Promoted to major general in February 1980, he assumed command of the 2nd Marine Division, FMF, Atlantic, Camp Lejeune, N.C., in June 1981. Following his promotion to lieutenant general Aug. 29, 1984, he was reassigned as Commanding General, FMF, Atlantic/Commanding General, II MAF, and Commanding General, FMF, Europe. General Gray was promoted to general and became Commandant of the Marine Corps July 1, 1987.

He is married to the former Jan Goss of Burlington, Vt.

## **Posture Statement by the Commandant of the Marine Corps**

### **Table of Contents**

<b>Prologue .....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>International Security Environment .....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Naval Forces .....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>The Corps .....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>Deployment Options .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Amphibious Lift .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Maritime Prepositioning .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Strategic Airlift .....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Current Operations .....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Counternarcotics Support .....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Right force...Right Focus...Right Capabilities .....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Service Planning .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>Research, Development and Acquisition .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>Aviation Combat .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>Ground Combat .....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>People -- Our Most Precious Resource .....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Recruiting .....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Retention .....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Force Structure .....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Quality of Life .....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Reserves .....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Retirees .....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Civilians .....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Training and Education .....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Sustaining the Force .....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>The Future .....</b>	<b>56</b>

# **A Report by General A.M. Gray Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1992-1993 Budget of the U.S. Marine Corps**

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to report to you on the readiness and capabilities of your Marine Corps.

## **Prologue**

For many years, Marine Commandants have been making statements on the posture and readiness of your Corps. In 1990 these statements were again put to the test. We had promised that we could respond to multiple crises around the globe at a moment's notice without mobilization. We have. We had promised that we would be light enough to get there, and heavy enough to win. We are. And we promised that your Marines would be warriors -- second to none. We believe they are.

Our global orientation, maritime character, and expeditionary capability have all been ably demonstrated during the past year. Marines were ready in the Philippines when they were needed to provide disaster relief, to improve security for our naval and diplomatic installations, and to provide a stabilizing influence. They were ready when American citizens and foreign nationals had to be evacuated from strife-torn Liberia and Somalia. And they were ready when called upon to fight in Panama and *DESERT STORM*.

Today, your Marine Corps is executing its legislated roles and missions. Approximately 80 percent of our operating forces are performing missions outside the continental United States. Our active and reserve Marine units operating around the world are fully-integrated fighting forces. These deployed units include 29 of our 33 infantry battalions, all of our tank battalions, and 60 of our 76 aviation squadrons. The impressive capabilities being demonstrated by this *Total Force* are the result of the superb planning and execution of legions of dedicated Marines and sailors operating under the leadership and vision of my distinguished predecessors. Equally as important has been the leadership of our civilian and military defense leaders in the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense. *Above all, none of these capabilities and readiness would be possible without the support of the American people as reflected by the support and actions of the*

*Congress.*

Even as our attention is focused on events in the Middle East, we must make decisions regarding military strategy and force structure that will determine our nation's military capability well into the next century. *It's not an easy task to reduce defense spending and force structure in a security environment in which the only certainty is uncertainty.*

## **International Security Environment**

For the past 45 years, our National Security Policy and Strategy has been consistent and effective. Based on the policy of containment, our strategy was built upon the pillars of deterrence, forward defense, and strong alliances. The result was a victory in the cold war and optimism about the prospects for peace in the future. Our optimism was short lived. The end of the cold war did not result in a world at peace.

Recent world events have shown that a relatively stable security environment has been replaced by one of increasing



instability and uncertainty. The collapse of the bi-polar balance of power will result eventually in a multi-polar world. However, during this period of transition, the world will be increasingly volatile as emerging powers attempt to take advantage of the current security environment and try to achieve hegemony in their respective regions. Transnational political entities such as terrorist organizations and traffickers in illegal narcotics will use unscrupulously whatever means are available to achieve their ends. Terrorism against individuals, property, and even the environment will continue to be an inexpensive weapon to achieve political objectives.

Nationalism is on the rise, especially in those countries upon which the developed world is dependent for its supply of strategic resources. These nations are beginning to demand a greater share of the wealth produced by their resources, and it is likely they will begin to exert increased influence on world affairs as they realize the extent of their power. This situation is complicated further by the proliferation of high technology weapons, weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. In some of these areas our access to materials, markets, and bases also could be threatened or reduced. In these same regions, dramatic increases in population coupled with an increased dissatisfaction about the gap between rich and poor will be a major source of regional instability and a cause of insurgencies.

Our nation's economy is becoming increasingly integrated within a single, worldwide economic order. This interdependence may cause conflict as existing political instabilities are exacerbated by economic disparity, increased competition for scarce resources, and growing nationalism. Our economic well-being will remain dependent upon our continued access to natural resources and world markets.


The shift from the relative certainty of the cold war to the uncertainty that lies ahead requires that we shift from a *policy of containment to a policy of stability*. The goal of this policy is the creation of the favorable political, economic, and security environments needed to achieve our objectives. To be successful, we must focus all the elements of our national power toward the achievement of a single goal -- worldwide stability. Our political, diplomatic, economic, and military means must be totally integrated and focused on the achievement of this goal. Our success will be dependent upon diplomatic influence abroad, political unity at home, and a credible military capability.

In light of the ongoing changes in the international security environment, we must continue the complete and comprehensive examination of our military strategy and military force structure requirements. We must develop a military strategy and force structure that will promote stability, foster collec-

tive security, and provide a hedge against uncertainty well into the 21st century. In doing so, we need a *strategic thought process* which recognizes that aerospace, maritime, and continental concepts are most effective when combined into a *single integrated strategy*.

Successful execution of a military strategy designed to assist in maintaining worldwide stability requires a *flexible military force structure that possesses a wide range of capabilities and aggregate usefulness*. The missions assigned to these forces will range from forward peacetime presence to sustained power projection operations. These missions will require the combined capabilities of all the components of our military force structure. This is why in the coming decade even greater emphasis will have to be placed on joint and combined operations since they provide the means to capitalize on the *existing complementary capabilities of each of the services*.

Each service must continue to focus on its respective roles and missions if we are to capitalize on the synergistic combat





capabilities that are the result of *decades of organizational focus and institutional ethos*. As we debate our future force structure requirements, we should remember that the unique missions and functional capabilities of the services are designed specifically to be *complementary, enabling, and enhancing*. Used together, they provide us the means to generate rapidly needed combat power tailored to the mission at hand.

## Naval Forces

The ability to maintain influence by *sustained forward presence* and, when needed, to project power ashore in distant regions of the world is a fundamental capability for successful execution of a stability strategy. We believe that Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary forces will continue to provide a significant portion of this required capability. Our naval forces are already structured and, more importantly, already postured to maintain forward presence and to be the lead elements of our power projection capability in many of our nation's regions of interest.

Today, our naval expeditionary forces are operating around the globe demonstrating U.S. interest, supporting our allies, ensuring our free use of the sea lines of communications and our access to markets, and providing an immediately available and credible crisis response capability. As demonstrated repeatedly, the presence of naval expeditionary forces, poised off the coast of a potential adversary for extended periods, can deter conflict and allow the diplomatic process to work. Should diplomacy fail, these forces can project combat power ashore with the necessary sustainment to accomplish a wide range of missions.

These expeditionary forces are a logical complement and, in some cases, the only alternative to the permanent forward-basing of land forces. Naval forces arrive on the scene with all of the inherent advantages that *seabasing affords: flexibility, mobility, security, and sustainability*. As a result, in many cases, naval forces are the "force of choice" for crisis response operations because of their ability to operate from sea bases without a need for host nation support, overflight rights, or aircraft and personnel bed-down sites.

Future conflicts may not offer us the luxury of established air and supply bases that often have been available. Naval forces provide the National Command Authorities with a flexible response option to crises by being able to: demonstrate resolve to belligerents and regional allies; evacuate and protect noncombatants; enable the early commitment of follow-on forces by seizing strategic facilities, choke points, and airfields; or to conduct strike operations and sustained operations over the shore. And, they also may perform supporting

operations such as SLOC protection, interdiction, and blockade.

Power projection will, in the most likely regions of instability, require a major maritime commitment. These operations normally will evolve from an initial presence by forward-deployed naval forces -- most likely a carrier battle group and an amphibious force which includes a special operations capable Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). This initial MAGTF could consist of either a Marine Expeditionary Unit or a smaller Special Purpose Force, since these type of forces are routinely forward-deployed to maintain influence and enhance stability in regions of interest.

As we have seen in the Persian Gulf, naval presence can be sequentially enlarged through the introduction of augmenting forces such as additional carrier battle groups, battleships, Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) and maritime prepositioning ship (MPS) squadrons. In addition, this initial naval presence also can be augmented by land-based forces with the sequential introduction of ground combat elements and land-based tactical aircraft.

## The Corps

Marine Expeditionary Forces with their flexible organization, their combined-arms and amphibious capabilities, and a centuries old relationship with the Navy are ideally suited for naval expeditionary operations. *Our legislated combined arms force structure* of three active and one reserve division/air wing teams are organized for combat as air-ground-logistic teams called *Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)*. These MEFs, strategically located and rapidly deployable, are our principal organization for combat and peacetime preparedness. They are *reservoirs of combined arms power* from which a variety of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) can be *task organized* for the mission assigned.

The MAGTF concept is based on the integration of ground combat, aviation combat, and combat service support elements under a single commander. This approach allows us to tailor the MAGTF in size and composition to meet the broadest range of operational requirements on short notice. All MAGTFs can possess special operations capabilities, be task organized as small special purpose forces, as light airlifted contingency forces, as amphibious assault forces, or as forces tailored to link-up with prepositioned supplies loaded aboard maritime prepositioning ships. They also can operate independently or as part of a joint task force.

In response to the present crisis in Southwest Asia we deployed several Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) aboard amphibious shipping, by strategic airlift, and by using



maritime prepositioning ships. We then combined these units into two MEFs: one ashore and one afloat aboard amphibious ships. The MEF ashore is a task organized force, specifically tailored for combined-arms warfare against a mechanized threat. The MEF afloat is task organized to conduct forcible entry operations *from the sea*.

### Deployment Options

**"Get to the fight fast with enough supplies to last."**

We continue to emphasize rapid response and sustainability in all aspects of planning and execution. Our expeditionary forces deploy by amphibious ships, strategic airlift, maritime prepositioning or a combination of all three means. Depending on the situation, we have the flexibility to task organize a force which maximizes the capability of each option: the utility, forcible entry capability, and endurance of amphibious lift; the capacity and sustainability of sealift; and the speed of airlift.

### Amphibious Lift

Much of our nation's ability to respond to simultaneous and multiple crises around the globe depends on the availability of amphibious shipping. In the midst of our Southwest Asia deployment, the largest naval deployment since World War II, amphibious forces were called upon simultaneously to evacuate American citizens and foreign nationals from Liberia and Somalia. These operations underscore our nation's need for flexible, responsive, and most importantly, *immediately available and forward-deployed Marine expeditionary and*

*Navy amphibious forces.* We believe that our *operational requirement* remains unchanged: enough *amphibious shipping* to lift two *Marine Expeditionary Forces* simultaneously. This allows us to land a Marine Expeditionary Force and still retain the flexibility to meet other worldwide operational requirements. Although budget constraints will not permit us to achieve this goal, it is the benchmark for measuring the difference between requirements and capabilities.

### Maritime Prepositioning

Ten years ago you implemented the Maritime Prepositioning Program (MPS) to complement our amphibious capability. The strategic deployment flexibility offered by MPS combines the advantages of airlift speed with sealift capacity and forward positioning to rapidly deploy Marine expeditionary forces in support of the warfighting CinCs. This program was validated in an operational environment for the first time last August in Southwest Asia. The first maritime prepositioning ships arrived in Southwest Asia within a week of receiving their movement orders. As they began off-loading their cargo, Marine units from California and Hawaii, flown in by strategic airlift, were there to link up with their supplies and equipment.

*All three of our MPS squadrons have been employed in the Persian Gulf.* Each of these specially configured squadrons provides enough tanks, artillery, vehicles, ammunition, supplies, food, fuel, and water to support a brigade of Marines for 30 days of combat. The utility of these ships did not end

with the off-load of their cargo. For example, two of the ships subsequently formed the nucleus of a floating, mobile, logistics seabase. They now provide maintenance, fresh water production, and fuel and munitions storage to the Marines in Southwest Asia. In addition, one ship has been reloaded and is providing a maritime prepositioned force capability for a Marine Expeditionary Unit. This ship is now on station in the Pacific for crisis actions.

MPS allows us to conserve the nation's critical strategic airlift. For example, the lead element of the I Marine Expeditionary Force, the 7th MEB (an integrated combined arms task force of over 18,000 Marines) used 259 strategic airlift sorties deploying to Southwest Asia. This is modest when compared to the 3,000 plus sorties that would be required to move the same force without maritime prepositioning.

MPS was designed to complement and enhance our strategic mobility and flexibility. It was not intended to be a substitute for the forcible entry capability which amphibious shipping provides.

Two aviation logistic support ships (T-AVB) also deployed to Southwest Asia. These specially configured ships, although not part of the MPS program, provide spare parts, technicians, and intermediate maintenance facilities and equipment. They can operate either underway or pierside. Without the T-AVB, 320 airlift sorties would be required to deploy each of these intermediate maintenance capabilities.


Our amphibious shipping, maritime prepositioning ships, and the T-AVBs have demonstrated their value in crisis response. This year's operations in Southwest Asia, Liberia, and Somalia would not have been possible without these relevant capabilities.

### Strategic Airlift

Marines can also deploy by strategic airlift either as part of a maritime prepositioning force operation or independently as Airlifted Contingency Forces (ACFs). Our ACFs are light task organized expeditionary forces rapidly deployable on very short notice. They can operate independently or as the lead element of a larger naval expeditionary force or joint/combined task force.

### Current Operations

Today, Marines are operating throughout the world. The events of the past year highlight the *global capabilities and flexibility of the Marine Corps*. The deployment of Marines to Southwest Asia and simultaneous operations in Liberia, the Philippines, and Somalia highlight the important contributions Marines make to our nation's security. The initial deployment of Marine units and the subsequent linkup with their



equipment provided the first credible task-organized, anti-armor, combined arms force during the early stages of the crisis. As the Marine presence grew from 40,000 in late October to over 90,000 Marines today, so did our capabilities. These Marines, specifically task organized for *DESERT STORM*, now form two MEFs.

The expeditionary force ashore, in essence a Marine Expeditionary Corps, consists of two reinforced Marine divisions, one Army armored brigade, four Navy construction battalions, one reinforced Marine aircraft wing, and two Marine force service support groups. The MEF afloat consists of about 18,000 Marines aboard amphibious ships. We tailored these two MEFs to accomplish a wide range of missions with units derived from all three of our Marine Expeditionary Forces and our Reserve Division/Wing Team. This was possible because of our organizational focus on sustained, task organized expeditionary operations and the flexibility and aggregate usefulness of our existing force structure.

In Operation *SHARP EDGE*, Marines responded to the crisis in Liberia. Upon receipt of the NCA tasking, we organized a Special Purpose Force from our forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit in the Mediterranean, embarked it aboard a Navy destroyer, and deployed it to Liberia. A few days later the amphibious ready group with the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable (MEU(SOC)) arrived. These sailors and Marines remained on-station for more than six months and evacuated over 2,400 American citizens and foreign nationals from the war-torn capital of Monrovia. The evacuation began as Marines were deploying to Southwest Asia for Operation *DESERT SHIELD*.

As the crisis in the Gulf intensified, American citizens threatened in Mogadishu, Somalia, required evacuation. Two amphibious ships detached from the task force operating in the Persian Gulf and steamed toward Somalia. Four hundred

and sixty miles from Somalia, two CH-53E helicopters loaded with a Marine Special Purpose Force were launched from amphibious ships. The helicopters were refueled twice en route at night by Marine KC-130 tankers, and arrived in time to safely evacuate American citizens and foreign nationals. Mission accomplished and helos back aboard, the ships steamed back to the Persian Gulf and are again engaged in *DESERT STORM*.

Since 1989, Marine expeditionary forces have maintained a continuous presence in the Philippines. These forces, drawn from III MEF forces forward deployed in Japan, are providing protection for our citizens, interests and naval installations.

#### Counternarcotics Support

We have supported strongly the President's National Drug Control Strategy as an integral part of the DoD effort to combat the importation of illicit drugs at their source, in transit, and within the United States. At the source, we are conducting training in riverine operations and providing mobile training teams to various Latin American nations on the front line of the Drug War. We have deployed a Tactical Air Operations Center which provides air surveillance radar coverage in Latin America in support of the Southern Command. Addi-

tionally, we provide personnel training and operational support to the Drug Enforcement Administration. We also conducted continuous OV-10 maritime detection and monitoring missions in the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean until August of 1990. Within the United States, Marine ground surveillance operations and other special operations are continuing along the southwest border. Further, Marines continue to conduct law enforcement operations along the California coast by providing surveillance of inlets that are potentially usable for drug smuggling.

We have not neglected the home front in our fight against illegal drugs. We are helping community leaders in their efforts to rid their neighborhoods of illicit drugs. These efforts include role model and education programs at grade and high school levels as well as efforts with community youth activities to offer positive alternatives to drugs. And we have been at the forefront in providing rehabilitation-oriented training to state and local corrections officers. We continue to assist the local enforcement agencies in developing leadership and motivational techniques for use in turning around the lives of young drug offenders.

#### Right Force...Right Focus...Right Capabilities

Our ability to respond to several crises simultaneously



while maintaining worldwide presence underscores the need for a Marine Corps of three active MEFs. *Three MEFs provide the capability and flexibility needed for global operations.* Our balanced MAGTFs with fully developed air-ground and logistics elements allow us to respond to a 60-day crisis without reserve call-up. Although our reserves are not used for crisis response, they provide a critical sustainment and reinforcement base for extended operations beyond 60 days. As the nation's *expeditionary force-in-readiness*, Marines arrive ready to fight with the sustainment necessary to accomplish the mission at hand.

### Service Planning

Conventional deterrence, protection of American citizens, security of critical installations, and warfighting are just four of the missions Marines are accomplishing today throughout the world. These contributions are the result of a deliberate and comprehensive service planning process that addresses all aspects of our training, education, doctrine, and equipment. Our service planning process is charting the future course of your Marine Corps. It has guided the response of the Marine Expeditionary Forces in Southwest Asia, and contingency responses in Liberia, Somalia and the Philippines.

Although the Marine Corps has significant capabilities, improvements in our expeditionary capabilities must continue. We have developed and continue to refine the three plans which will guide our Corps into the next century. The first,

the *Marine Corps Campaign Plan*, provides a common direction to the Fleet Marine Forces and the supporting establishment. The second, the *Marine Corps Long-Range Plan*, projects the long-term security environment as well as the concepts, capabilities, and goals needed to meet the challenges that are 10 to 20 years into the future. The third, the *MAGTF Master Plan*, focuses on operational concepts and requirements through the year 2000. This master plan places an increased emphasis on revolutionary warfare and regional conflict. By incorporating the goals outlined in the long-range plan into our master plan, we are able to establish and identify the priorities for developing our mid and long-range operational requirements.


### Research, Development and Acquisition

Our primary research, development, and acquisition goals are aimed at enhancing our multi-mission capable forces and further developing an over-the-horizon assault capability. Every equipment modernization decision supports these goals. The key thoughts are *mobility, flexibility, speed, and significant combat advantage*. Several systems currently under development will help us meet our goals.

### Aviation Combat

Recent events have reemphasized the critical need to replace our *medium assault lift helicopter fleet*. Operations in SWA, Liberia, and Somalia underscore the vital necessity for a medium assault lift capability that includes increased speed,





range, survivability, payload, and the subsystems required for precision navigation at night and in adverse weather. Today, Marines are operating in a combat environment that pushes the CH-46 to the edge of its operating limits. If production started today on its replacement, the CH-46 fleet would be more than 40 years old by the time the last aircraft retired. While we are sensitive to the current fiscal environment, advances in surface-to-air munitions have placed this airframe and the Marines that it carries at risk. The process of evaluating the medium assault lift requirement and selecting alternatives is ongoing. However, we have reached the point where we can no longer afford to postpone the decision to replace the CH-46.

To meet our other operational requirements, we have requested procurement of AH-1W, CH-53E and F/A-18 aircraft. This continued force modernization is essential to our future warfighting capabilities.

We continue to pursue evolutionary enhancements to the capabilities of our aircraft. We are especially interested in *improving our ability to conduct night and adverse weather operations from over-the-horizon. The achievement of these capabilities remains a crucial warfighting requirement.* Our programs are structured to capitalize on mature and proven technology that requires a minimum investment in RDT&E and procurement.

Our *AH-1W Night Targeting System is a critical warfighting requirement.* We are planning to procure 18 systems during fiscal year 1992. Further, we expect delivery of the precision navigation systems for the AH-1W to begin this year. We are also in the process of standing up our second squadron of Night Attack *HARRIERS*. Equipped with a forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR), night vision goggles and a cockpit optimized for night operations, the Night Attack AV-8B provides for around the clock operations. Additionally, our fiscal year 1991 AV-8Bs will be radar

equipped to provide an air-to-air capability.

We also have enhanced our overall night and all-weather capabilities by the modernization of our F/A-18A aircraft to F/A-18Cs and the transition from A-6Es to F/A-18Ds. Our first F/A-18D squadron is currently deployed to Southwest Asia. The transition of a second squadron of A-6Es to F/A-18Ds is underway. The addition of FLIR and a night vision device will measurably improve our night attack capability. The continued addition of other improvements will provide our F/A-18Ds with an all-weather targeting capability. We also have translated lessons learned during operations in Southwest Asia into improvements in our night fighting tactics, our use of electronic countermeasures, and our ability to navigate in combat.

We seek new procurement only when modifications are not practical. We have further reduced operating costs and increased the commonality of our force by retiring three older Type/Model/Series of aircraft from our inventory. *Our goal is to reduce the types of aircraft in our inventory with no loss of capability.*

#### Ground Combat

The *Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) Program remains our primary developmental research effort.* The AAA will provide the high-speed movement of the surface assault forces from ships beyond the horizon to inland objectives. The final product of the AAA Program will complement the Navy's Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and our medium assault lift aircraft in improving dramatically the forcible entry capability and tactical mobility of our expeditionary forces.

We will add the LAV Air Defense variant to our family of Light Armored Vehicles and will continue the research and development of an assault gun variant. Concurrently, we continue to improve communications interoperability with all U.S. and Allied military forces. Several systems will help fulfill this communications requirement: the Marine Air Command and Control System, the Joint Service Imagery Processor, the Marine Tactical Command and Control System, and the Single Channel Ground-to-Air Radio System. These systems, in combination with other programs, will improve dramatically our ability to exchange secure, near real-time tactical information in joint and combined operations.

Whereas equipment is a vital necessity to any military organization, nothing is possible without our *greatest asset -- people.* Our deployment to Southwest Asia and the subsequent buildup of supplies and equipment is a tribute to the quality of our young men and women who make the whole system work.

## People...Our Most Precious Resource

Operation *DESERT STORM* has clearly proved the efficacy of the Marine Corps' Total Force Policy. Today, more than 80 percent of the Fleet Marine Forces and 50 percent of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve are deployed side-by-side outside the Continental United States. Their combined performance reaffirms the wisdom of building our Total Force with quality Marines -- highly trained, educated, and prepared!

### Recruiting

Our Total Force has been strengthened by the recruiting successes of the past three years. More than 95 percent of our accessions were high school graduates with over 67 percent scoring in the upper three Armed Forces Qualification Test categories. These achievements provide the Marine Corps with responsive, highly motivated, and intelligent Marines. As amply demonstrated by recent events, these young Americans give us the kind of quality we need to man a force capable of dealing with an uncertain world situation.

As we proceed into the 1990s, we will continue to seek out the same high quality young Americans. Successful recruiting is a combination of articulating the challenges of being a Marine, providing recruiters with the advertising resources to get the word out, and raising compensation levels enough to attract *the quality individual we seek*. *A smaller, more elite Corps will demand that every Marine be multi-talented*. Changing demographics and increased competition for America's youth will make our search for quality more difficult. Helping our recruiters succeed will require adequate funding for our recruiting and advertising programs.

### Retention

The success of our recruiting program is mirrored by impressive successes in our retention programs. We are especially proud that the Marine Corps surpassed its overall reenlistment goals for fiscal year 1990. In achieving our retention goals the Marine Corps has improved unit cohesion, increased unit stability, and lowered training costs. In this way, retention programs provide a very high return on recruiting and training investments. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program is one of the most important factors contributing to our success. Its continued funding will be important to the future of your Marines.

### Force Structure

In the midst of an exceptionally busy operational period and despite mounting tensions throughout the world, we are preparing to *reduce our end strength*. I must emphasize that these reductions will have a *disproportionate impact on our operating forces*: the Fleet Marine Forces, Marine Security Forces, Marine Support Battalion (Naval Security Group),


and the Marine Security Guard Battalion. Our training and supporting establishments is extremely lean and cost effective. Strength reductions will, therefore, have the greatest impact on our operating forces -- *the forces called upon to do so much in an uncertain world*.

The years ahead will challenge our leadership, imagination and creativity in ways we had not heretofore experienced. We must preserve our readiness and warfighting capability as we reduce the size of a force expanded by the demands of the present crisis. My primary concern is that we remember the loyal and dedicated service of the Marines who are doing what must be done in Operation *DESERT STORM*. Any "draw-down" must be fair to all Marines, take advantage of the new reduction authorities you have provided, be equitable, and respect the dignity of our Marines and their families.

### Quality of Life

Our Family Service Centers are important to our Marine Corps family. There are 18 Family Service Centers located in the United States and overseas. The demands on these centers have increased steadily over the past three years. For example, there have been over 350,000 contacts during the past fiscal year, a fact that underscores the Family Service Centers' value to our Marines and their families. In addition, the demands on our Child Development Centers have increased dramatically. Additional support in these areas will be required if we are to fulfill the needs of our Marine family.

Anticipated manpower reductions will also test many of the programs designed to help Marines transition from military to civilian life. For instance, Marines with good service records who are involuntarily separated after six years but less than 20 years of service will receive separation pay. Other programs that you have supported and sponsored through the Transition Assistance Management Program will also ease the transition to civilian life.



## Reserves

*DESERT STORM*'s smooth integration of reserve combat, combat support, and combat service support units into the active forces has proven the viability of our integrated training and exercise programs. Our reserve forces are a key component of our warfighting capability. For example, reserve Marines are assuming several active force missions by providing the majority of forces for Exercise *BATTLE GRIFFIN* -- a Northern Region NATO exercise. They are also participating in Exercise *TEAM SPIRIT* in Korea, Exercise *AHUAS TARA 91* in Honduras, and Exercise *SOLID SHIELD* within the Atlantic Command. Additionally, the 4th Marine Division has assumed I Marine Expeditionary Force's drug interdiction mission in support of Joint Task Force 6 along our Southwest border.

## Retirees

Our retirees continue to prove the maxim, "*Once a Marine always a Marine.*" In recent months I have received hundreds of phone calls, letters, and visits from retired Marines asking to return to active duty to support our efforts in the Persian Gulf. The spirit embodied in these warriors remains the foundation upon which we continue to build our Corps of the future. For example, many of our *retired Marines take an active role in our Professional Military Education programs.* We are not ignoring this important resource, and we continue to support fully the programs upon which they rely.

## Civilians

Our *civilian employees* are critical to our success. They are strategically placed in our supporting activities to help us keep Marines in the operating forces. This is why reductions to our civilian structure must be carefully considered.

## Training and Education

Our nation's military capability is enhanced by a Marine Corps prepared for battle by demanding and comprehensive training and education programs. These programs have institutionalized the qualities that have made Marines what they are. Your Marines are taught not only combat skills but, more importantly, they are taught to outthink any opponent and to seize and maintain the initiative. This is a testimony to our combat-oriented *Marine Battle Skills Training* which is designed to develop and sustain basic combat skills throughout a Marine's career.

Our *Professional Military Education (PME)* program develops *innovative, thinking leaders.* It encompasses professional self-study that includes correspondence courses, professional reading, symposia, and formal schools. Our educational programs are designed to assist *all* Marines in their personal growth within the profession of arms. For example, our Non-

Commissioned Officers participate in a continuous program of PME. At each level in their career our NCOs are studying the profession of arms either at school or in the field. Quality small-unit leadership has always been our trademark. Our PME program will ensure the tradition continues.

The *Marine Corps University*, founded in 1989 and located at Quantico, is responsible for developing and coordinating PME throughout the Corps. This includes resident and non-resident PME for both active-duty and reserve Marines. The resident schools of the Marine Corps University include the NCO schools, Staff NCO Academies, The Basic School, Communications Officers' School, Amphibious Warfare School, and Command and Staff College.

Our *School of Advanced Warfighting*, a year-long extension of our Command and Staff College, will better prepare officers for key positions in high-level joint and combined staff billets. The *Art of War Studies* program is part of our current effort to upgrade the quality and depth of the Marine Corps University faculty. A handful of select senior officers spend a year studying advanced issues in strategy and the operational art. The graduates of this top-level school will then serve two-year tours as faculty members at the Marine Corps University. Progress is also being made on the University's planned research facility. It will be a comprehensive facility that will provide related research services for the analysis and study of expeditionary and amphibious warfare.

## Sustaining the Force

Perhaps the most noteworthy achievement during Operation *DESERT SHIELD* was the rapid deployment to Southwest Asia of a credible, task-organized combat force with an *organic sustainment* capability. A fundamental characteristic of naval forces is that they deploy with an adequate level of sustainability. As a policy, our MEFs deploy with 60 days of supplies.

Operations in Saudi Arabia have proven our ability to sustain our forces. We committed over 80 percent of our operating forces and a larger percentage of war reserve stocks to meet the requirements of this contingency. Without our logistics depth, acquired through years of persistent programming efforts and your consistent support, our rapid build up of needed combined arms power in Southwest Asia may not have been possible.

The Marine Corps did not develop this logistics capability without costs. In the process of achieving a force with *balanced ground, aviation, and service support forces* we insisted that organic sustainability be maintained in spite of strong pressures to try and gain "tooth" at the expense of "tail." As a result our combat service support is in our active



force structure and we will continue to maintain a "tooth" to "tail" ratio consistent with a truly expeditionary force.

The kind of logistics capability demonstrated during *DES-ERT STORM* is critical to our nation's military capability. Decisions in the post-war era, when resources are scarce, will be difficult. However, we must reconstitute our sustainability and our MPS capability to meet the next crisis as quickly as possible. The unfolding nature of world events will not allow us the luxury of taking our time to prepare for the next crisis.

## The Future

There will always be those who will continue to make the mistake of underestimating the resolve of the American people. They will persist in challenging us along littorals and in the rapidly-expanding urban centers of developing nations, many of which have experienced extraordinary population growth and thus face suddenly-released national, ethnic, and economic aspirations. These factors will combine to generate new frictions, renew old feuds, and contribute to instability.

Such circumstances dictate that as our nation moves into the 21st century we face the challenge of determining the right mix of military capabilities based on need and affordability. Fortunately, the foundations of our military requirements are in existence today. In particular, our nation will continue to require a Navy and Marine Corps of sufficient size, quality, and ability to ensure freedom of the seas and the projection of power to maintain peace and stability wherever United States national interests may be.

We believe that your Marine Corps is ready for the challenges that are ahead. We will continue to provide the nation with the highest possible return on its defense investment.



Our strengths will remain versatility, readiness, and aggregate utility. Operating with the other services, we will continue to provide the nation with a competitive advantage of unmatched usefulness. And we will overcome whatever challenges are ahead with a degree of excellence on the part of Marines, regular and reserve, expected by the nation and demanded by our traditions. No Commandant could ask for more, nor report to you, the representatives of the American people, with greater pride. As always the Marine Corps is grateful to you for your loyal support. Your Corps stands ready and prepared to do what must be done!

Our request for fiscal year 1992/1993 is as follows:

Appropriation	(\$ Millions)			
	FY90	FY91	FY92	FY93
Military Personnel Marine Corps	\$5,799	\$5,912	\$6,067	\$6,101
Reserve Personnel Marine Corps	314	337	327	330
Operation and Maintenance Marine Corps	1,851	1,890	1,895	1,740
Operation and Maintenance Marine Corps Reserve	78	85	76	75
Procurement Marine Corps	1,100	690	1,039	651
Family Housing Marine Corps Allocation	151	133	131	113
Military Construction Marine Corps Projects	162	139	95	153
Military Construction Marine Corps Reserve Projects	16	9	5	3
Stock Fund Marine Corps	26	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$9,497</b>	<b>\$9,195</b>	<b>\$9,635</b>	<b>\$9,166</b>